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Abstract
We provide a new theory of the role of banks as catalysts for industrialization. In
their in°uential analysis of 19th century continental European industrialization, Ger-
schenkron and Schumpeter accorded banks a central role, arguing that they promoted
the creation of new industries. We formalize this role of banks by introducing ¯nancial
intermediaries into a 'big push' model. We show that banks may act as `catalysts' for
industrialization provided that they are su±ciently large to mobilize a critical mass of
¯rms, and that they possess su±cient market power to make pro¯ts from coordination.
The theory provides simple conditions that help to explain why banks seem to play a
creative role in some but not in other emerging markets. The model also shows that
universal banking helps to reduce the cost of coordination. Finally, we show that one
disadvantage of catalytic banks is that they may favor concentration in the industrial
sector.
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own.1 Introduction
A signi¯cant problem in the study of emerging markets is that there are relatively few data
points. It isthereforeparticularly important to go back in history to learn from all available
experiences. Historically, economists accorded great importance to the role of banks in the
development of new markets and industries. The in°uential work of Gerschenkron (1962)
and Schumpeter (1934, 1939), for example, placed banks at the center of economic growth.
Theiraccountsof theroleof banks, however, di®erin someimportant ways from ourmodern
theories of banking, which emphasize the role of banks in screening and monitoring ¯rms.
In the modern view, the impetus for economic growth is generated in the real economy,
and the banking system provides some important, but ancillary, services. The work of
Schumpeter, Gerschenkron and others, however, is somewhat bolder. It accords banks a
more active and 'creative' role, where banks are central actors of the real economy who
act as catalysts for industrialization and growth. Because this view does not ¯t well with
modern banking theory, it has become almost forgotten. Yet it emerged from a careful
study of industrialization in several European countries, that were arguably some of the
most successful emerging economies ever. What can a modern day economist make of the
notion of banks as catalysts for economic activity?
Gerschenkron related the creative role of banks speci¯cally to the so-called 'catch-up'
problem. He argued that the main challenge for achieving rapid economic growth in 19th
century continental Europe was coordination of industrial activity. Britain had already
pioneered industrialization, and the issue in continental Europe was to mobilize resources
to follow itsexample. Following the seminal work by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), a
recent literature on 'big push' models has formalized the notion of catch-up economy. This
literature, reviewed by Matsuyama (1995a), has focussed on a variety of positive exter-
nalities between investments in order to derived the existence of multiple Pareto-rankable
equilibria. In the typical model, a low equilibrium is characterized by a self-perpetuating
belief that no industrialization occurs, whereas a high equilibrium is sustained by a self-
ful¯lling expectation that industrialization will occur.
While 'big push' models have been used to explain periods of rapid industrialization,
it may come as a surprise that the role of banks has not been addressed in this literature.
In fact, 'big push' models study the conditions under which an economy may ¯nd itself
stuck in a low equilibrium, but pay little attention to which institutions may remedy the
coordination failure which generates the low equilibrium itself. We are thus left with some
important open questions. Can banks a®ect the economy-wide equilibrium? What are
the theoretical foundations for the role of banks as catalysts for industrialization? What
does it mean to create new industries or to be a catalyst for growth? And under what
circumstances would banks want to take such an active role in the economy?
1This paper sets out to providea modern economic understanding of the role of banks as
catalysts for industrialization in emerging economies. Thepaperbreaksout into threeparts.
We want to build a theory that is informed by history. In the ¯rst part of the paper we
thus review historic evidencethat suggests an activerole for banks. Based upon thework of
Schumpeter, Gerschenkron and others, we provide historic evidence from three continental
European countries that experienced periods of rapid industrialization: Belgium from 1830
to 1850, Germany from 1850 to 1870 and Italy from 1894 to 1914. We focus on what
role banks play in these countries and uncover some interesting common patterns. In each
country a small numberof banksaccounted forthebulk of investmentsin theindustriesthat
generated rapid economicgrowth. Thesebanksinvested in a portfolioof¯rmsthat depended
on one another and that together pioneered new markets and industries. These banks were
also large oligopolists, that held powerful market positions at the beginning of the rapid
growth periods. Interestingly, these were also the banks that pioneered universal banking.
And as time proceeded, these banks changed their focus from ¯nancing new and innovative
¯rms to protecting those incumbent ¯rms by encouraging industrial concentration. These
historical facts are clearly important for any economist interested in the role of banks in
emerging markets. They also challenge us to provide a clear theoretical explanation.
In the second part of the paper we confront the historic approach with the tools of
modern theoretical analysis and develop a new theory of the role of banks in promoting
industrialization in emerging economies. Our starting point is a generic 'big push' model
where therearetwo Pareto-rankableequilibria. Weask how a bank can induce the economy
to move from the low to the high equilibrium. We show how a bank can mobilize a 'critical
mass' of ¯rms, i.e. invest in a set of ¯rms that induces other banks and ¯rms to also invest
in the emerging markets. Making such 'catalytic' investments, however, is shown to be
costly. A bank will only invest in a critical mass if it expects to recover its losses. This
meansthat in the high equilibrium thebank needs to make pro¯ts on some additional ¯rms
outside the critical mass. The model then yields two important predictions. Banks will
only play a catalytic role if they are su±ciently large to invest in a critical mass of ¯rms.
And they need to have enough market power to recoup the costs of mobilizing the critical
mass. Next, we show that the costs mobilizing the critical mass are reduced if banks are
allowed to own equity. The intuition is that equity allows the banks to participate in the
value they create by mobilizing the critical mass. This leads to an additional prediction of
the model, that universal banks will ¯nd it easier to promote investmentsin new industries.
Moreover, we show that catalytic banks are not immune from disadvantages. In particular,
one disadvantage of banking concentration is that it may foster concentration in the indus-
trial sector. More speci¯cally, we show that the number of entrant ¯rms that are ¯nanced
to compete with an industry incumbent is lower in the presence of large banks. We also
2develop a number of extensions of our model that show the robustness of these predictions.
The third part of the paper takes the theory back to empirical evidence. We examine
some additional facts not considered by Gerschenkron and Schumpeter. We look at cases
where banks did not play a catalytic role in the industrialization of emerging economies,
at political economy issues, and at alternative catalysts for industrialization. We relate
this variation in behavior to the predictions of the model. Moreover, we derive further
implications that can be formally tested.
Webelievewearethe¯rst to introducebanks into a model of the'big push.' Thisallows
us to examinea new role for banks that has received scant attention in the literature: cata-
lyst to industrialization. This role is distinct from thetraditional roles attributed to banks,
namely the allocation of capital and the screening and monitoring of individual ¯rms (see,
for example, Fama (1980), Diamond (1984), and Stiglitz (1985), among others). For an
extensive survey of modern theories of banking, see Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). This
catalytic role is also distinct from the literature on relationship banking (see, for example,
Allen and Gale(1997), Aoki and Patrick (1994), Din» c (2000), Rajan (1992), and von Thad-
den (1995)), since we are concerned about the economy-wide e®ects of the interactions of
one bank with many ¯rms at a time, as opposed to the details of the interaction between
one bank with oneclient over time. We thus contribute a distinctly novel 'macro' theory of
banking.
A large literature has developed the role of banks in economic development. See, for
example, King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and especially the survey
by Levine (1997). This literature has focussed on the role of ¯nancial intermediaries in
facilitating exchange and providing liquidity (e.g. Bencivenga and Smith (1991)), and in
diversifying risks (e.g. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)), or on comparing banks and stock
markets in facilitating economic development (e.g. Levine and Zervos (1998)). Our paper
complements this literature by examining the role of banks in coordinating investments.
This paper is also related to the literature on the role of venture capital for ¯rm creation
and innovation (see Lerner and Merges (1998), Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002) and Kaplan
and StrÄ omberg (2000)). And our theory contributes to the literature on universal banking,
surveyed by Benston (1994).
Theremainderof thepaper isorganized as follows. Section 2 provideshistorical evidence
from three formerly emerging continental European countries|Belgium, Germany, and
Italy|describing the role of banks in industrialization and linking it to thestructureof the
¯nancial system. Section 3 develops the theoretical model, examining the conditions under
which banks can act as a catalyst for industrialization. Section 4 derives from the model
several testable hypotheses and discussess some recent relevant formal tests. It is followed
by a brief conclusion. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
32 Banks and the industrialization of Belgium, Germany and
Italy
In his seminal work on economicdevelopment, Gerschenkron (1962, p.45) wrote that \[t]he
focal role in capital provision in a country like Germany must be assigned not to any
original capital accumulation but totheroleof credit-creation policies on part ofthebanking
system." Rondo Cameron (1967, p.129) wroteabout Belgium: \[S]ubsequently [to 1830] the
economy entered a period of explosivegrowth accompanied by the development of a unique
set of banking institutions." Schumpeter (1939, chapter 7) gaveGerman Kreditbanken large
credit fortaking an entrepreneurial attitude and fostering theriseof large industries. These
economic historians clearly saw a link between fast industrialization and the ¯nancing of
industry by private banks. They also pointed out problems stemming from the oligopolistic
structure of ¯nancial markets. Tilly (1982)) and Riesser (1911, ch.5), for example, note
that in the laterstages of Germany's industrialization the power of those banks that helped
industrialize also led to a certain 'ossi¯cation' of both the industrial and banking market
structures. Confalonieri (1982) makes a similar point for Italy after 1907 in his conclusions.
In this section we examine historical evidence from the three continental European
countries that experienced fast industrialization in the nineteenth century, focusing on the
initial stages of their industrialization: Belgium (from 1830 to 1850), Germany (from 1850
to 1870), and Italy (from 1894 to 1914). We devote particular attention to the structure
of credit markets, an aspect often alluded to in the debate among economic historians but
rarely linked explicitly to the role of banks as industrial promoters. We thus provide a
novel perspective from which to look at well known facts. For each country we show that a
few large private banks ¯nanced the majority of new industrial ¯rms. These banks did not
develop as a consequence of industrialization, but pre-existed it. They enjoyed considerable
market power in an oligopolistic banking market that was protected by regulatory barriers
to entry. They actively promoted investment in industrial technology, and engaged in
coordination of industrial investments. These banks acted not only as lenders but also as
shareholders, thus pioneering universal banking. And over time, they actively encouraged
the cartelization of several industries in order to protect existing ¯rms and the stability of
their pro¯ts. Moreover these banks were concerned with maintaining the oligopoly among
industrial ¯nanciers, possibly at the cost of slowing down growth and innovation in the
industrial banking sector itself.
2.1 Belgium
Belgium, the ¯rst country to follow Britain in the Industrial Revolution, achieved its in-
dustrialization roughly between 1830 and 1850. Over this period, its GNP grew at a yearly
42.5%, well above the 1.4% European average.1 Industrialization transformed the structure
of the economy, which until then was based on small ¯rms engaged in traditional produc-
tion. Between 1830 and 1860 its industrial capacity grew at a yearly averageof 4.4%, more
than twice as in the previous thirty years (Bairoch (1982), p.292). Modernization was most
intense in the heavy industries. Between 1830 and 1850 coal mining grew at a yearly 5.3%,
zinc mining at 20.0%, and steam engines at 7.9%.2
Critical to thissuccess was theaction of two banks. The Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale pour favoriser
l'industrie nationale was the world's ¯rst joint-stock investment bank. It had been created
in 1822, and became active in industrial ¯nance from the early 1830s. The Banque de
Belgique was founded in 1835, and engaged in industrial ¯nance from the outset.3 These
two banks accounted for about two thirds of thecapitalization of all industrial credit banks
(Durviaux (1947), p.56),4 and their assets grew by an average yearly rate of 3.8% between
1834 and 1850 (Chlepner (1926), p.76-8). Thesetwo banks ¯nanced themselves mainly with
their own capital; until 1850 deposits never accounted for more than 25% of the liabilities
(Durviaux (1947), p.37). Otherindustrial banksexisted, but weresmallerand mostly local.5
Entry of joint stock-banks into the ¯nancial sector was restricted, sincethegovernment had
discretionary power in granting banking charters, according to article 7 of the Code du
Commerce (Neuville [1974], p.109-11). Indeed, the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale and the Banque de
Belgique faced no competition from incorporated banks.
These two banks assisted and actively encouraged ¯rms in fast growing industries to
adopt the corporate form in order to raise large amounts of external ¯nance.6 Between
1835 and 1838 alone, the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale organized 31 industrial joint-stock companies
(soci¶ et¶ es anonymes), and theBanquedeBelgique24. They also helped thesenew ¯rmsraise
a combined capital of 154 million Francs. (Cameron (1967), p.145). The two banksinvested
a large share of their capital in industrial equity: 31% for the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale and 26%
for the Banque de Belgique in 1847 (Chlepner (1930), p.26). In 1860, the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale
controlled about a ¯fth of the country's industrial joint-stock capital, which amounted to
1Bairoch (1976a), p.281-6. In per capita terms these two ¯gures are 1.6% and 0.8%, respectively.
2Cameron (1967), p.148. Railways played a lesser role at this stage of the Belgian industrialization,
though in these two decades 850 km of railroads were built, Mitchell (1980), tab G1.
3On the development of the Belgian ¯nancial sector see Cameron (1967), Chlepner (1926,1930,1943),
Morrison (1967), Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale de Belgique (1922), and Wee (1981).
4The initial capital of the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale was 33 million Francs, which was doubled in 1837; the initial
capital of the Banque fu Belgique was 20 million Francs, Durviaux (1937), p.11.
5See Cameron (1967), p.134-6, and Chlepner (1930), p.21-24. At least seven such banks appeared in the
late 1830s: The Banque Li¶ egeoise, the Banque Commerciale d'Anvers, the Banque d'Industrie, the Banque
de Flandre, the Banque Fonci¶ ere, the Caisse Hypot¶ ecaire, and the Caisse de Propri¶ etaires, Chlepner (1930),
p.61-3.
6Six industrial soci¶ et¶ es anonymes (joint-stock companies) existed in 1830, which grew to 150 in 1839,
and to 200 in 1857, Cameron (1967), p.130. Durviaux (1947), p.53, gives a detailed sectoral breakdown, and
Neuville [1974], p.113-5, yearly data. See also Morrison (1967), p.64, and Chlepner (1943), p.8-9.
51 billion Francs.7 As Cameron (1967, p.145) put it, \banks did not respond passively to
demand for credit, but actively sought new ¯rms, underwrote their stock issues, ¯nanced
potential stockholders, held stock in their own names, placed their o±cers on the board
of directors of the companies they promoted, and ministered to the companies' needs for
both working capital and new capital for expansion." These investments turned out to
be pro¯table. The net income of the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale, for instance, which started at a
level around 4% of assets in 1830, increased constantly until 1860 (Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale (1922),
Annexes).
The Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale and the Banque de Belgique were the ¯rst examples of universal
banks. They identi¯ed industries with high potential for growth, to which they extended
credit and in which they bought equity participations.8 Forthis purpose they cameup with
an important innovation, ¯nancial trusts.9 Financial trusts were holding companies which
managed the two banks' industrial portfolios.10 This way they enhanced the coordination
of investment decisions by otherwise scattered entrepreneurs (Wee(1981), p.6). Bank man-
agers consulted their clients on business strategies, and sometimes acted as their ¯nancial
managers.11 Cameron (1961, p.90-1) describes how the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale actively encour-
aged mining companies and foundries to incorporate, obtained Royal charters for them,
and provided the necessary ¯nancing. Banks thus carried out an intense coordination of
industrial activities.
2.2 Germany
Germany is often cited as the quintessential case of bank-driven development. Between
1850 and 1870 the German economy experienced a quick industrialization which allowed
it to become the ¯rst economic power on the continent. In this period its GNP grew at a
yearly 2.4%, well above the 1.9% European average and its own 1.6% growth rate of the
previous two decades.12 Between 1860 and 1880 its industrial capacity grew at a yearly
4.6%, up from 1.7% in the previous thirty years, and was concentrated in textiles and
heavy industries (Bairoch (1982), p.292). Production of coal increased ¯vefold, and pig
7In the 1840s it controlled mining companies responsible for more than a quarter of the whole coal
extraction, Neuville [1974], p.123.
8See Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale (1922) for a detailed description of the bank's policy of sectoral investment.
9The Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale created one subsidiary and three investment trusts. The Banque de Belgique
created two subsidiaries and two investment trusts, Morrison (1967), p.64-5. Chlepner (1930), p.10-2 and
p.36-7, describes their role.
10The banks themselves did retain shareholdings of some corporations, see L¶ evy-Leboyer (1964), p.641 for
the Banque de Belgique, and Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale (1922), annex 6, for the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale.
11Cfr Chlepner ( 1926), p.86-7, and Wee (1981), p.5-6.
12Bairoch (1976a), p.281. In per capita terms the growth of GNP was 1.6% in Germany and 0.9% in
Europe, p.286.
6iron sixfold, spurred a threefold expansion of railways (Mitchell (1980), tables E2,E8,G1).
The German industrial credit banks, Kreditbanken, played an active role in industrial de-
velopment combining commercial and investment banking activities and nurturing close
relations with industry (Da Rin (1996)). Of the 40 Kreditbanken founded between 1848
and 1870, four accounted for most of the industrial credit activities: The Schaa®hausen
Bankverein, the Disconto Gesellschaft, theBank fÄ ur Handel und Industrie and the Berliner
Handelsgesellschaft. Their capitalization accounted for nearly half of that of all industrial
credit banks, and they were also much larger than the unincorporated industrial credit
banks (Privatbanken), which operated locally. The average founding capital of these four
Kreditbanken was 33 million Marks (Riesser (1911), Appendix 3), versus only 1 million for
the average Rhenish Privatbankier.13 These four banks used mainly their own capital as
a source of ¯nance, remaining well above 40% until 1870 (Tilly (1966a), ch.5 and 8). In
Prussia, by far the largest German state, incorporations were granted discretionally by the
government, and entry as a Kreditbank was restricted. Indeed the government granted a
joint-stock charter only to the Schaa®hausen Bankverein (Tilly (1966a), p.111). The other
three Kreditbanken were organized as unincorporated limited liability companies. This con-
straint seems to have been binding, for when incorporation was liberalized in 1871, there
were scores of new joint-stock banks. The ¯nancial sector remained fairly concentrated
even afterwards, as a small number of very largeKreditbanken, theGrossbanken, dominated
the smaller Provinzbanken (Jeidels (1905), p.112). Grossbanken acquired several local and
regional Provinzbanken in order to retain a leading position and keep up with the growth of
the economy. Six large bank groups, Konzernen thuscameto dominate the industrial credit
sector, which independent Provinzbanken were never able to challenge(Riesser (1911), part
IV).
The credit channeled by Kreditbanken increased at an average yearly rate of 19.4%
between 1852 and 1870, from 20 to 492 million Marks (Ho®man (1965), p.743). Between
1851 and 1870, 259 ¯rms incorporated, up from 102 in the previous 25 years. Incorporation
was typically managed with the help of an industrial credit bank.14 Kreditbanken acted as
universal banks, providing loansand issuanceof securities fortheirclients but also retaining
equity positions in those ¯rms (Riesser (1911), p.62-6). Their activity concentrated in few
regions and industries: The Rhineland, Ruhr, Silesia and Saxony; in mining, machinery,
textiles, construction, and railways.
German banks frequently took equity participations in their clients. Riesser (1911,
13Tilly (1966a), p.66. Rhenish Privatbankiers were the earliest and largest to engage in industrial ¯nance
in Germany.
14Riesser (1911), p.38. Kreditbanken also supported ¯rms that assumed unincorporated limited liability
form (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien). See also Jeidels (1905) and Motschmann (1915) for detailed
accounts of the role of Kreditbanken in industrial ¯nance.
7p.339-40) describes in detail theparticipations taken by Kreditbanken in railwaysand heavy
industries in the 1850s. These equity holdings absorbed much of the banks' capital: from
the 13% of the Schaa®hausen Bankverein (p.72) to the 50% of the Bank fÄ ur Handel und
Industrie (p.81). Many equity holdings arose from illiquid loans during the 1857 economic
slump, but with time several of them became pro¯table.
Universal banking was overall pro¯table, though losses were experienced in the early
years (Tilly (1966a), ch.8). The average dividend in the 1850s and 1860s was 6.7% for
the Bank fÄ ur Handel und Industrie, 7.0% for the Disconto Gesellschaft, 7.2% for the
Schaa®hausen Bankverein, and 7.3% For the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft (Riesser (1991),
p.68). Moreover each bank accumulated several million Marks of surplus reserves.
Thepersonal natureoftheirbusinessrelationshipsallowed themtoelicit and circulatein-
formation e®ectively, and to havea strong in°uenceon investment decisions (Da Rin (1996),
p.29-30). As Richard Tilly (1966b, p.181) argued: \the contribution of German bankers to
the mobilization of capital operated not only on the supply side but on the demand side
as well; by organizing and allying themselves so closely with industrial enterprises, bankers
strengthened and in part represented the demand for investment funds."
In Germany industrial concentration increased sincethe recession of the 1870s. Concen-
tration took the form of both cartelization, which was both legal and politically popular,
as well as mergers and acquisitions. Riesser (1911) devotes a large section of his book to
this issue. He notices that Kreditbanken were more active in fostering concentration in
industries which depended heavily on external ¯nance. For example, in electrical equip-
ment about forty joint-stock companies were created in the 1880s and early 1890s, mostly
¯nanced by banks. By 1900, however, only 28 had remained, organized in seven industrial
groups. This consolidation process had been orchestrated by the major Kreditbanken, each
of which backed one industrial group. Similarly, in the extractive industries banks exerted
in°uence by either actively spurring concentration or simply upholding it. Banks had been
the main ¯nanciers of the coal and iron works in the Ruhr in the 1860s, and during the
1880s they helped groups like Krupp, Hoesch and the Rhenish Steel Works to become the
dominant market players. Feldenkirchen (1991, p.127) provides additional evidence on the
roleof bank in theconcentration of heavy industries, and remarks that when cartels proved
brittle in the recession of the 1880s, banks promoted concentration through acquisitions.
Finally, some of themost interesting examplescome from thechemical industry (see Da Rin
(1998)). In the1860s and 1870s, the large universal banks were instrumental in the creation
of this highly innovative industry, ¯nancing ¯rms like BASF, AGFA, Degussa, Hoechst and
Bayer. While these ¯rms were extremely successful, banks refrained from ¯nancing further
entrantsafterthisinitial founding wave. This enabled thesepioneer-turned-incumbent ¯rms
to dominate the various segments of the chemical industry (see also Beer (1959), ch.11).
82.3 Italy
The last case we consider is Italy, which industrialized rapidly between the early 1890s and
World War I. Between 1893 and 1913, its industrial output grew at a yearly 4.8%, up from
0.5% in the previous two decades, and GDP grew at 2.5%, up from 0.6%.15 The yearly
growth rate of manufacturing production (1896-1913) ranged from 4.0 to 6.2% according
to di®erent estimates.16 Between 1894 and 1913 the yearly growth rates were 15% in elec-
tricity, 12.9% in chemicals, 10.7% in iron and steel, 7.5% in engineering, all higher than in
other European countries (Cohen (1967), p.364). The share of producers' goods in total
production rose from 28% to 47% (Romeo (1972), p.68). Private industrial credit banks
(`banche di credito ordinario') played a key role in channeling savings towards industrial
high growth sectors and in in°uencing the direction and timing of investments. The Banca
Commercialewas founded in 1894 and theCredito Italiano in 1895, just before the economy
made its `big leap.' They controlled nearly two thirds of the assets of all industrial credit
banks, which increased at a yearly rate of 4.9% over the two decades up to world war I.17
Their funding came more from their own capital rather than from deposits, which typically
accounted for less than a quarter of liabilities (Confalonieri (1976 and 1982), statistical
annexes). The few competitors to the Banca Commerciale and the Credito Italiano were
smaller banks, which generally operated in Northern Italy (Confalonieri (1976, vol.3). The
two leaders spurred investment in electricity, mechanical engineering, metals, and automo-
biles, while overlooking traditional industries like textiles.18 Also, they focused their e®orts
toward ¯rms in theNorthern `triangle' between Genova, Torino and Milano (Aleotti (1990),
p.58-60).
In the case of Italy sheer size seems to have been enough to deter entry by other large
industrial credit banks. Indeed the Banca Commerciale and the Credito Italiano were
successful in imposing exclusive relationships to most of their clients (Confalonieri (1976,
vol.2), p.329).
Italian industrial credit banks were another instance of universal banking. They encour-
aged ¯rms to incorporate and managed the issue of their equities and bonds on the stock
market. Between 1900 and 1913 Italian joint stock companies grew from 848 to 3,069, and
between 1900 and 1907 they raised about 2.7 billion lire, mostly on the stock exchange (Ale-
15Fuµ a (1965), tab.1 and 3. Similar data are in Gerschenkron (1962), p.75. The yearly per capita growth of
GNP between 1890 and 1913 was 1.5%, slightly higher than the European average of 1.4%, Bairoch (1976a),
p.286.
16Federico and Toniolo (1988), discuss the reliability of di®erent estimates.
17Cohen, (1972), p.78. Confalonieri (1976), vol.3, provides a thorough discussion of the evolution of the
Italian ¯nancial system.
18As we can read in the early reports of the Banca Commerciale, the bank strove to be `active part ...
in all the major and worthy signs of the economic development in our country' (Confalonieri (1976),vol.3,
p.42, our translation).
9otti (1990), p.61-7). In 1897 there were 30 listed companies in the Milano Stock Exchange,
which grew to 169 by 1908.19 Both the Banca Commercialeand the Credito Italiano played
a major role in planning and ¯nancing these operations. Between 1894 and 1906 the Banca
Commerciale took part in 145 capital market operations, and the Credito Italiano in 84.20
Confalonieri (1976, vol.3) describes in detail the involvement of the Banca Commerciale in
the steel, electric and mechanical sectors, and of the Credito Italiano in sugarre¯ning, iron,
and chemicals (1976, vol.2). He concludes that investment banking activities favored their
role as promoters of industrial undertakings.
Investments in industrial securities (both equity and bonds) by theBanca Commerciale
and theCredito Italiano ranged from 5% to 10% of their assets between 1895 and 1906, and
contributed a corresponding shareof theirnet income.21 Largeloansto largeindustrial ¯rms
accounted for another 20-30% of assets and income (Confalonieri (1976), vol.3, p.486). The
net incomeof Banca CommercialeItaliana rose from 1.3 million lira in 1895 to 12.7 millions
in 1913, and that of Credito Italiano from 0.9 to 5.4, respectively (Confalonieri (1976 and
1982), statistical annexes). In both cases income growth was steady and accelerating.
Like the Belgian banks with investment trusts, the Italian banks managed their indus-
trial participations through subsidiaries. But unlike their Belgian colleagues, they did so
by acquiring control in industrial companies which they used as holding companies. This
was often the case with fast growing industries: electricity, chemicals, iron and steel.22
Gerschenkron (1962, p.88) argued that in Italy \[a]s in Germany, not only capital, but a
good deal of entrepreneurial guidance was channeled to the nascent and expanding indus-
trial enterprises. As in Germany, the policy was to maintain an intimate connection with
an industrial enterprise and to nurse it for a long time before introducing it to the capital
market."
Italian industrial credit banks were also protective of the competitive positions of their
clients. For example, Cohen (1967, p.375), writes that 'banks recognized that their pro¯ts
were related to the expansion of the industries in which they were involved. Competition
was inimical to the banks' best interests; expansion was not, so the banks encouraged it.'
19Most of these were in electricity, transportation, and textiles, Aleotti (1990), p.62.
20These operations were °otations, mergers and acquisitions, capital increases, debt conversions, see Con-
falonieri (1976), vol.2, p.341-5.
21Confalonieri (1976), vol.2, p.322, and vol.3, p.476. The Banca Commerciale had larger participations
but also a larger balance sheet than the Credito Italiano. Both banks invested substantial amounts in public
bonds and in short term loans.
22Some such cases were: Societµ a Edison (BCI), Vizzola (BCI), Societµ a Industrie Elettro-Chimiche (CI),
Unione Italiana Concimi (CI), Montecatini (CI), Ferriere Italiane (CI), Societµ a Elba, Acciaierie Terni (BCI),
and Acciaierie Savona (BCI). Confalonieri (1976), vol.3, chapter 3, details their history, which is also studied
by Cohen (1967), p.378-80, and Romeo (1972), p.77-83. Holding companies were used to coordinate bank
activities also in the mechanical industry, but to a lesser extent. Such instances were o®ered by O±cine
Meccaniche (BCI and CI) and Cantieri Pattison (CI). BCI also used the Societµ a Generale di Navigazione
Marittima to coordinate its activity in steamship, see Confalonieri (1976), vol.2, chapter 6.4.
10His discussion of the steel industry is instructive. The industry was dominated by the
three ¯rms of the Terni-Savona group, which had been ¯nanced by Banca Commerciale
and Credito Italiano. In 1904 the law for the development of Naples granted a ten year
tax exemption to new enterprises located there. This created a unique growth opportunity
for the only mid-sized independent ¯rm, the Piombino of the Bondi family. However, such
an investment by Piombino in Naples would have threatened the dominance of the Terni-
Savona group. In 1905 the two banks set up a new ¯rm, Ilva, whosesteel mills were located
near Naples. Ilva eventually took the leadership of the bank-supported cartel (see Cohen
(1967, p.379-80) and Confalonieri (1976), vol. III, ch.3). The move was successful, since
by 1911 the cartel produced virtually all the Italian pig iron and 58% of the steel market
(Cohen (1967, p.380). In his monumental work, Confalonieri (1976, 1982) provides further
examples of bank support for industry consolidation. He emphasizes the role of the Banca
Commercialeand Credito Italiano after1907, when overcapacity in someindustries brought
several ¯rms into distress. The two banks fostered concentration in theheavy industries, in
high-tech industries like fertilizers, and even in more traditional industries like textiles.
The historic evidence we have presented raises a number of important questions. What
does it mean for a bank to promote industrialization and to be a catalyst? Under what
circumstances can private banks take such a role, and under which conditions would they
actually choose to take it? What are the costs and bene¯ts of such actions? Also, is the
historical similarity in ¯nancial market structures across countries a mere coincidence, or
is there a de¯nite relationship between bank size, bank market power and bank activity in
industrial promotion? What is the signi¯cance of universal banking for thepromotion of in-
dustrialization in emerging economies? And what is therelationship between concentration
in banking and concentration in the industrial sector?
To answer these important questions and to make sense of these episodes in economic
history, we seek guidance from theory. Theories of the big push have so far focussed on
identifying thereasonsfor the multiplicity of equilibria and fortheexistenceof coordination
failures, but have given little attention to addressing possible remedies. In particular, the
roleof ¯nancial intermediarieshasnot been addressed in this literature. Thisisourstarting
point for developing a model to examine under what circumstances pro¯t-motivated banks
would act as catalysts for industrialization.
113 A simple model of coordination failures
3.1 The model set-up
Our model lasts two periods. There areQ entrepreneurs, who have a choice of either doing
nothing, or starting a ¯rm.23 For simplicity, we assume that the Q ¯rms are identical and
indexed by q =1:::Q. Without loss of generality we will speak interchangeably of ¯rms
and entrepreneurs. Creating a ¯rm entails an investment of F in the ¯rst period, which
generates pro¯ts in the second period. To focus on the coordination problem, we simplify
the analysis by assuming that there is no uncertainty about the future outcome of the
investment, nor any asymmetric information. We will relax these assumptions later. Each
entrepreneur has an endowment of W, with W <F, and thus needs to raise an external
amount of ¯nance, equal to X=F¡W >0. Let K be thenumberof entrepreneursinvesting.
The (gross) return to any particular ¯rm q is given by f(K). This is assumed to be an
increasing function of K, so that an individual entrepreneur's return depends positively on
the investment decisions of all other entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs raise funds from ¯nancial intermediaries. We will focus on banks as
¯nancial intermediaries. Accordingly, we ¯rst examine pure debt contracts. Let ¾ be the
(gross) return to the investor (i.e. the bank). We denote the lending rate by i, so that
¾=(1+i)X. Later, we will extend the model to allow for more general securities, where
investors choose the functional form of ¾.24
For simplicity, we assume that all investors face a constant cost of capital. Let r denote
the riskless rate of return, and let ¯= 1
1+r be the discount rate. We assume that:
¯f(1)<F; ¯f(Q)>F
This ensures the existenceof multiple equilibria, which is the focus of our analysis. Thenet
present value of ¯rm's q pro¯ts when K ¯rms are set up (including q) is then given by:
¼(K; i) = ¯[f(K) ¡¾] = ¯[f(K) ¡(1+iq)X]
where iq is the interest rate paid by ¯rm q. The investor's net pro¯ts for investing in
entrepreneur q are then given by:
23Alternatively, we can think of this as a choice between investing in traditional versus new technologies.
See Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
24Throughout the analysis, however, we assume that a contract with an entrepreneur can only be condi-
tioned on the returns of her own ¯rm, but not on the returns of other entrepreneur. This is necessary to
eliminate some arti¯cial solutions where the coordination problem in the economy can be trivially solved
through sophisticated contracting. See Segal (1999) for a similar restriction on bilateral contracting.
12½q(iq) =¯¾q ¡X =¯(1+iq)X ¡X
The interest rate o®ered to entrepreneur q depends on the ¯nancial market structure. We
use a simple price-leadership model that allows for a one-dimensional parameterization of
the intensity of competition in the ¯nancial market. In particular, we assume that there
exists a competitive fringe of z `small' investors which can ¯nance exactly one entrepreneur
each. Moreover, there exists a lead investor (L henceforth), who can always ¯nance (Q¡
z) entrepreneurs. The ¯nancial market is perfectly competitive when z = Q, so that L
disappearsand thelending ratei equalsthedeposit rater. If thefringeissmaller(0<z<Q),
L has some market power. If the fringe disappears (z=0), L is a monopolist.
Thesequenceof actionsis asfollows. L moves¯rst and o®ers contracts to entrepreneurs.
The fringe investors observe L's o®ers, and then make their own o®ers to entrepreneurs.
Finally entrepreneurssimultaneously decidewhether or not to set up a ¯rm and which o®ers
to accept.
3.2 Multiple competitive equilibria and the need for coordination
In this section we examine the rational expectations equilibria when ¯nancial markets are
competitive. In this case z=Q, and there is no lead investor but only a competitive fringe.
We immediately state:
Proposition 1 With a competitive ¯nancial market there exist two Pareto-rankable com-
petitive equilibria, one where all entrepreneurs invest, and one where no entrepreneur in-
vests.
Proposition 1 follows immediately fromi=r for all q, and theassumption that ¯f(1)<F
and ¯f(Q)>F. The intuition is that whenever there is a `large' number of entrepreneurs
(hereQ) starting new ¯rms, then complementaritiesmakeit worthwhilefor all entrepreneurs
to also invest. Likewise, when only `few' entrepreneurs (here none) set up a ¯rm, it is not
pro¯table for others to also do so. We name the equilibrium with no entrepreneurs the
SQE (`Status Quo' Equilibrium) and the equilibrium with all entrepreneurs investing the
EME (`Emerging Market' Equilibrium).
Theexistence of multiple equilibria is a coordination failure. In the SQE the belief that
noentrepreneurwill set up a ¯rmisself-ful¯lling, i.e., it impliesthat noentrepreneuractually
undertakes that costly action. Likewise, in the EME the belief that many entrepreneurs
are setting up a ¯rm justi¯es the investments by many entrepreneurs.
Previous work in this literature has focussed on the possibleexistence of a coordination
failure and characterized the conditions under which either equilibrium may attain. The
13focus of ourpaper isinstead on how to eliminate theSQE. To break thebeliefs that sustain
the SQE requires that agents know that the SQE cannot be an equilibrium any longer.
We therefore say that coordination has been achieved if and only if the SQE is no longer
an equilibrium. In explaining emerging markets, we thus do not rely on a spontaneous
coordination of beliefs. This would assume rather than derive it. Instead, we ask under
what circumstances ¯nancial intermediaries such as banks can promote the emergence of
markets in a way that does not rely on spontaneous or fortuitous coordination.
One may obviously ask why the focus on banks? We have already presented historic
evidence on the importance of banks. Thereare also some interesting theoretical reasons.25
An interesting implication of proposition 1 is that an economy, where there are only small
savers and direct ¯nancing from savers to ¯rms, is not able to achieve coordination and
induce the emergence of new markets. This suggests that some type of ¯nancial interme-
diation is necessary to achieve coordination.26 Financial intermediaries, such as banks, are
a natural potential candidate for coordination. First, the availability and terms of external
¯nancing directly in°uence entrepreneurs' decisions to set up a ¯rm. Second, ¯nancial in-
termediaries provide funds, which are an essential input for most ¯rm. Moreover, ¯nancial
intermediaries interact with many entrepreneurs and thus have a unique opportunity to
induce coordination. Finally, they have a ¯nancial self-interest in the emergence of new
markets.
3.3 Banks as catalysts
We now examine how the lead investor L can induce coordination. To this purpose we
introduce the notion of a 'catalyst,' i.e., an agent whose actions precipitate a change. The
question we ask is under what circumstances an investor may act as a catalyst for emerging
economies.
In order to achieve coordination it is necessary for all entrepreneurs to believe that a
'critical mass' of entrepreneurs will start a new ¯rm. The critical mass M is de¯ned as the
smallest number of entrepreneurs which, by creating new ¯rms, make starting a ¯rm the
only equilibrium strategy for all other entrepreneurs. Formally, M2(1;Q) isa critical mass
if ¼(M; r)<W and ¼(M+1; r)¸W.
It is useful to break down the pro¯ts of L into two parts: those pro¯ts which result from
mobilizing the critical mass, and those made on all other entrepreneurs. Let iq and iz be
25While we emphasize the role of ¯nancial intermediaries, we do not claim that they are the only possible
coordination mechanism. Indeed in Section 4.3 we discuss alternative institutions that may also induce
coordination.
26Note that this argument complements the argument by Diamond (1984) that ¯nancial intermediaries
are needed for organizing the monitoring process that individual savers could not undertake on their own.
14the interest rates paid by ¯rms in the critical mass and by ¯rms outside the critical mass,



















are the net pro¯ts made on the entrepreneurs outside the critical mass.
Proposition 2 Suppose L uses pure debt contracts. Then:
(i) Inducing coordination is costly: Ã<0;
(ii) There exists a critical value b z such that L induces coordination if and only if the
competitive fringe has size z<b z;
(iii) The average cost of capital to entrepreneurs is higher than the riskless interest rate
r.
The proof is in the Appendix. We illustrate the intuition behind Proposition 2 with the
help of Figure 1, where for simplicity we draw ¼(q;r) as a continuous function. L needs
to convince M entrepreneurs to set up a ¯rm despite their pessimistic beliefs. It can do
so by o®ering them loans in which the interest rate is low enough to make them willing to
set up a ¯rm. L makes a loss on each of the loans in M. Area Ã in Figure 1 indicates L's
losses. Notice that L cannot raise the interest rate on these loans, otherwise ¯rms in the
critical mass M would not invest. Once ¯rms in the critical mass have been o®ered loans
which convince them to create a ¯rm, all other entrepreneurs are also willing to follow suit.
Thus L sets the interest rate for entrepreneurs outside the critical mass at the level iz, so
as to maximizeits pro¯ts ½L. Area º in Figure1 indicates L's pro¯ts from these loans. It is
clearthat thelarger thecompetitivefringethefewerentrepreneursL can ¯nanceoutsidethe
critical mass. This puts an upper bound to b z, sinceL needs somepro¯ts from entrepreneurs
outside the critical mass, to recoup the losses from investing in the critical mass.
An interesting insight of Proposition 2 is that while the presence of L allows the econ-
omy to move to the EME, entrepreneurs face a higher average cost of capital than under
spontaneouscoordination with perfectly competitive¯nancial markets. This shows that the
existence of market power, while helpful to promote coordination, also has a cost.
15The main point of our model is that, in order to act as a catalyst, an investor needs
to be large enough to mobilize a critical mass of entrepreneurs, as well as possess enough
market power to make pro¯ts on the other entrepreneurs who start new ¯rms, so as to
recoup the cost of coordination. To express our results in the simplest possible fashion, we
have chosen to model the ¯nancial market with a Stackelberg model where a lead investor
is a ¯rst mover and a fringe of perfectly competitive investors are followers. The important
part of this assumption is that L is a ¯rst mover, and that it has enough market power to
recoup the cost of coordination. By ¯nancing a critical mass, L acts as a catalysts for the
investment of all other entrepreneurs. Theway we model thefringe isnot asimportant. All
that matters is that second mover investors do not compete away all the rents that L needs
to recover the cost of coordination. Undi®erentiated Bertrand competition between L and
one or several other investors would destroy any rents accruing to L. But other models of
imperfect competition, such as Cournot, di®erentiated Bertrand, or others would also leave
some rents for L. The general insight is thus that the structure of the ¯nancial market
a®ect the bank's ability to engage in coordination.
3.4 The role of equity ¯nance
So far we restricted investors to only provide standard debt contracts. In this section we
show that the cost of coordination can be reduced, and sometimes even eliminated, if L is
allowed to o®er equity contracts. Suppose that L holds some equity and denote its holding
by ®.
Proposition 3 If L can o®er entrepreneurs equity ¯nance then:
(i) Ã is a decreasing function of ®;
(ii) b z is an increasing function of ®;
(iii) ½L is an increasing function of ®;
(iv) Under pure equity ¯nance there exists b F such that Ã·0 i® F > b F;
(v) Under pure equity ¯nance there exists c W such that Ã·0 i® W>c W.
The proof is in the Appendix. The main intuition for Proposition 3 is that when L ¯-
nances entrepreneurs with equity, it participates in the pro¯ts obtained in the EME. In
other words, L partially internalizes the externality that is at the root of the coordination
problem. This reduces the cost of subsidizing entrepreneurs in the critical mass and makes
coordination easier. The decrease in the coordination cost also means that the competitive
fringe can be larger. Part (iv) says that coordination costs will (will not) disappear when
the costs of creating a ¯rm are su±ciently large (small). For a given W, a higher invest-
ment cost increases L's stake, which reduces the cost of mobilizing a critical mass. Part (v)
says that coordination costs will (will not) disappear when the entrepreneur's endowment
16is su±ciently small (large). Again, for a given F, a lower endowment W increases L's stake
and thus his ability to capture the rents from coordination.
3.5 Optimal securities and incentives
So far, we have examined a model that uses the standard securities used by banks, namely
debt and equity. In this section weturn to theissueof optimal securities. Thereexistsa vast
literatureon security design, wheredi®erent contractual or informational imperfections lead
to di®erent optimal securities.27 A potential problem with introducing optimal securities is
that they can be very sensitive to speci¯c model assumptions. In this section we show that
the optimal contract in the base model yields a result that is neither realistic nor robust.
We also show that all the insights from the previous section continue to hold if we extend
the model by incorporating incentive issues.
Consider the model as it stands. We have seen that the returns to L are larger if it uses
equity instead of debt. This is because with equity L participates in theupside it creates by
inducing coordination. If welook for L's optimal choice of security, it is immediate that the
optimal contract would make the investor the full residual claimant. This can be achieved
with some kind of reverse-debt contract|where the entrepreneur holds the ¯xed claim|or
simply a buy-out contract, where the investor acquires the company and the entrepreneur
receives a ¯xed payment. It is straightforward to show that with such a contract, there are
never any costs of coordination. This result, however, is not very robust. In particular, it
disappears once we allow for incentive concerns. More speci¯cally, if L is the full residual
claimant, the entrepreneur is left with no incentive to provide e®ort for the venture. If the
model focuses on only one problem, namely coordination, then the optimal contract takes
the degenerate form of making the investor the residual claimant. But if we recognize that
an optimal contract needs to solve several problems, such as a coordination problem and
an incentive problem, then it needs to trade-o® the bene¯ts of allocating residual returns
between the entrepreneur and the investor.28
In theAppendix weexaminean extension of themodel wherethereareboth coordination
and incentiveproblems. Themain insight we gain from this exercise is that the results from
the previous sections continue to hold. More precisely, if L is made the residual claimant,
then it could extract all the rents it creates from inducing coordination. But this leaves
entrepreneurs with no incentives to exert optimal e®ort. Since we cannot make both the
entrepreneur and the investor the residual claimant, the optimal contract needs to trade
o® the bene¯ts from providing entrepreneurial incentives with the bene¯ts from allowing L
27See, for example, Gale and Hellwig (1985) or Hart and Moore (1995), and Harris and Raviv (1991) for
a useful survey.
28Another reason why the entrepreneur has to bear some residual risk might be adverse selection.
17to recoup the cost of coordination. The optimal contract, therefore, does not allow L to
capture all of the rents it creates through coordination. This generates the need for market
power, and we get back all of our previous results.
3.6 Heterogeneous ¯rms
The main model uses Q identical ¯rms. In this section we outline how the model can
be extended to the case of heterogeneous ¯rms without losing its fundamental insights.
Since the formal analysis is lengthy and complex, we relegate it to the Appendix. Here we
motivate the choice to develop such a complex model and highlight the additional insights
we gain from such an exercise. Developing a model with heterogeneous ¯rms is interesting
in a number of respects. Firms may clearly di®er in terms of their own pro¯tability. Maybe
even more important, they may di®er in terms of the externality that they provide for
other ¯rms. Interestingly, this opens up the possibility for L to choose the critical mass
strategically.
We examine a very general model where the returns for entrepreneur q are given by
f(K;q), where K is the vector of all the other entrepreneurs starting a new ¯rm. The only
assumption we will make is that f(K;q) is a super-modular function of K. This says that
all the externalities are non-negative. This is a very sparing assumption, since it allows
each q to have its distinct externality on all other ¯rms in K.
An important di®erence to the base model is that with heterogeneous ¯rms, there may
be more than two competitive equilibria. However, we show that there always exists a
'maximal' and a 'minimal' equilibrium. If an entrepreneur sets up a new ¯rm in any
equilibrium, then she also does so in the maximal equilibrium. The maximal equilibrium
is thus the most inclusive, and it Pareto-dominates all other equilibria. It is natural to call
this equilibrium the EME. It should be noted, however, that the EME is in general not
socially e±cient, since it may still exclude some ¯rms that are not pro¯table on their own,
but that would provide a positive externality for all others. There exists also a minimal
equilibrium that has only those entrepreneurs (possibly none) starting a ¯rm that also do so
in all higher equilibria. Thisequilibrium isPareto-dominated by all others, and wenaturally
call it the SQE.
An interesting aspect of themodel with heterogeneous¯rmsisthat theequilibriainduced
by L will in general look di®erent than the competitive equilibria. This is because L can
internalize at least someof the externalities. We show that the highest equilibrium induced
by L alwaysincludes(weakly)more¯rmsthan thehighest competitiveequilibrium, although
it still includes (weakly) fewer ¯rms than the outcome that would maximize economy-wide
output. A potential problem with achieving coordination with heterogeneous ¯rms is that
L may not always want to implement the EME. We show that the conditions on size and
18market power are necessary, but they may not always be su±cient to induce the EME.
Nonetheless, they are su±cient to at least induce an equilibrium that is better than the
SQE.
Another important aspect of the model with heterogeneous ¯rms is that L chooses the
critical mass strategically. Forexample, it may prefer to ¯nancean entrepreneur whose ¯rm
is only mildly pro¯table, or even outright unpro¯table, but that provides a large positive
externality on other ¯rms.29 Therefore, there may be morethan one critical massand more
than one target equilibrium. Di®erent combinations of ¯rms may all work to induce an
equilibrium that is at least as large as theEME, and the resulting equilibrium may depend
on what critical mass is mobilized. L may include some entrepreneurs in the critical mass
that would not havestarted a ¯rm in theEME. Moreover, oncesomeof theseentrepreneurs
outside of the EME start a ¯rm as part of the critical mass, there may be yet some other
entrepreneurs outside EME that now do so as well. Heterogeneity of ¯rms thus allows for
a bewildering variety of ways of mobilizing critical masses and reaching di®erent outcomes.
However, the basic logic of how to induce a higher equilibrium continues to apply. In
particular, we show that with debt contracts L always makes losses on all entrepreneurs
in the critical mass. This implies that there is always a cost of coordination. And as
a consequence L needs to be not only large enough, but also requires su±cient market
power to cover coordination costs. And we show again that the use of equity reduces and
sometimes even eliminates the cost of coordination.
3.7 Bank concentration and concentration in the industrial sector
The model so far identi¯es the bene¯ts of having a lead bank with su±cient size and
market power to induce a critical mass of investments. In this section we extend the model
to examine the potential disadvantages of such a mechanism. In our historical analysis,
we noted that the concentration in banking was often associated with concentration in the
industrial sector. The powerful banks thus discouraged competition among ¯rms, especially
in those industries where they had already ¯nanced the incumbents.
To examine these issues, we now provide a simple extension of our base model that
allows us to examine the relationship between banking concentration and concentration in
the industrial sector.30 In the ¯rst period, banks can ¯nance a set of ¯rm Q, that we can
think of as pioneers in their own industries. In the second period, banks can re¯nance
these incumbents. In addition, we introduce a set of potential entrants. For simplicity,
29Note that historically banks have often invested in infrastructural projects whose payo® takes a long
time to arrive, if it does at all. Investment in railways and canals are typical examples of infrastructural
projects with substantial externalities on the rest of the industry, even if unpro¯table by themselves.
30For other models on the ills ofmarket power in ¯nancial markets, see Hart(1983)orAghion, Dewatripont
and Rey (1997).
19we assume that for every incumbent, there is exactly one potential new entrant. Both
types of ¯rms require an investment of F per period. Without entry the returns to the
incumbent are given by fm
2 , where the superscript m stands for monopoly. With entry,
the returns to the incumbent and the entrant are given by fdi
2 and fde
2 , respectively, where
the superscripts di and de stand for duopoly-incumbent and duopoly-entrant.31 Weassume
that (¯fm
2 ¡F) > (¯fdi
2 ¡F) +(¯fde
2 ¡F). This is a standard assumption that ensures
that a monopoly maximizes pro¯ts even though competition may be socially desirable.
Consider now the decision of a bank in the second period. If competition reduces ¯rm
pro¯ts, a bank never wants to ¯nance an entrant to its incumbent. However, there may be
pro¯table opportunities to ¯nance entrants to incumbents ¯nanced by another bank. We
call a potential entrant to a fringe-¯nanced incumbent a \fringe-entrant" and a potential
entrant to a lead{bank-¯nanced incumbent a \lead-entrant." The lead bank will never
¯nance a lead-entrant, but may well consider ¯nancing a fringe-entrant. A fringe bank, on
the other hand, is willing to ¯nance both lead-entrants and fringe-entrants, as along as it
is not an entrant to its own incumbent.
As in the base model, the lead bank makes its investments ¯rst, and the fringe follows.
We assume that fdi
2 ¸fde
2 , so that all banks ¯rst re¯nancetheir own incumbents by lending
them an amount X. We denote the number of fringe-entrants ¯nanced by the lead bank
by EL2[0; z], and the number of (fringe- or lead-) entrants ¯nanced by fringe bank by Ez.
Also, weallow for a fairly general speci¯cation of Ez, imposing only that Ez is an increasing
function of the fringe bank's ¯rst period pro¯ts (@Ez
@iz >0), as well as the number of banks
in the fringe (@Ez
@z >0).
Let pbetheprobability that apotential entrant is¯nanced. Thereisa di®erencebetween
pz and pL, i.e., between the probability that a fringe-entrant is ¯nanced (and enters the
market of a fringe-¯nanced incumbent), and the probability that a lead-entrant is ¯nanced
(and enters the market of a lead-bank-¯nanced incumbent). If the lead bank invests in EL
fringe-entrants, there are Q¡EL potential entrants left (of which Q¡z are lead-entrants and
z¡EL are fringe-entrants). It follows that pL= Ez





Q¡ EL, and that
pz >pL (with a strict inequality whenever EL>0). This already shows that competition is
always weaker in those industries that are ¯nanced by the lead bank.





2 . Increasing EL has two opposite e®ects. First,
there is a (positive) direct e®ect, as L makes pro¯ts from ¯nancing fringe-entrants. Second,
there is a (negative) spillover e®ect, since an increasein EL increases pL. If L ¯nances more
fringe-entrants, then the fringe banks will have fewer fringe-entrants to ¯nance, and will
31For simplicity, we assume that returns f
x
2, where x=m; de;di, are independentof K. It is straightforward
to relax this assumption.




2 ) denote the ratio of the lead bank's bene¯t of ¯nancing a fringe-
entrant (¼de
2 ) to the potential cost of gaining (through the spillover e®ect) a competitor for
one of its incumbent ¯rms (¼m
2 ¡¼di
2 ).
Lemma 1 De¯ne µ=
(Q¡z)Ez
Q2 and µ= Ez
(Q¡z). Then:
(i) For µ < µ, L is `defensive' and chooses EL=0;
(ii) For µ <µ < µ, L is `moderate' and chooses EL2(0;z);
(iii) For µ >µ, L is `aggressive' and chooses EL=z.
The proof is in the Appendix. The intuition for this Lemma is that a higher bene¯t-to-
cost ratio µ increases L's interest in ¯nancing fringe-entrants. For low and high values we
naturally ¯nd corner solutions, where L ¯nances either no or all fringe-entrants.
We are now in a position to examine the main question of this section: How does the
¯nancial market structure a®ect competition in the industrial sector. For this, we want
to examine the e®ect of our measure of competition in the banking sector, z, on the total
amount of competition in theindustrial sector, asmeasured by E=Ez+EL. Weimmediately
state:
Proposition 4 An increase in the competition in the ¯nancial sector (z) has three di®erent
e®ects on the amount of competition in the industrial sector (E):
(i) An increase in z increases the number of entrants ¯nanced by the fringe banks:
dEz
dz >0. This e®ect is relevant for all values of µ.
(ii) An increase in z increases the number of fringe-entrants EL that the lead bank can
¯nance: dEL
dz >0. This e®ect is relevant only when µ>µ.
(iii) The increase in Ez increases the potential spillover e®ect, reducing the lead bank's
interest to ¯nance fringe-entrants EL. This e®ect is relevant only when µ <µ <µ.
The proof is in the Appendix. Proposition 4 identi¯es three potential channels for how
changesin thebanking market structurea®ect competition in theindustrial sector. Consider
¯rst the case of a 'defensive' lead bank that never ¯nances entrants (µ< µ). Entrants can
then be ¯nanced only by fringe banks. The larger the fringe, the more entrants will be
¯nanced. More competition in banking (as measured by the size of the fringe, z) thus
increases competition in the industrial sector. Consider next the case of an 'aggressive'
lead bank that is eager to ¯nance fringe-entrants (µ >µ). There is now a second e®ect:
the larger the fringe, the larger is the set of fringe-entrants that the lead bank can ¯nance.
This second e®ect reinforces the ¯rst one. There is thus an even stronger link between
banking competition and competition in the industrial sector. Consider ¯nally the case of
a 'moderate' bank (µ<µ<µ). In addition to the two previous e®ects, a moderatelead bank
21also considers the spillover e®ect, which reduces the bank's interest in ¯nancing entrants.
This third e®ect, however, is likely to be fairly small. Indeed, in the Appendix we derive
conditions that ensures that the spillover e®ect is dominated by the ¯rst two e®ects.
So far wederived the optimal investment policies for the second period. Theanalysisfor
the¯rstperiod isanalogousto thebasemodel, and weomit thedetails. However, thereisone
additional insight that isworth mentioning, namely that lead bank may have an incentive to
retard ¯nancial development. To see why, consider L's maximization problem. L wants to
maximize½L=½L
1 +¯½L
2, wherethe¯rst period pro¯ts aregiven by ½L
1 =Ã+(Q ¡ M¡ z)(1 + iz)X
and, as before, Ã is the loss on the critical mass. Note that the ¯rst period interest rate
a®ects the ¯rst period pro¯ts of the fringe banks, which, in turn, a®ect their ability to
¯nance entrants in the second period. The growth of the ¯nancial sector, measured in
terms of the pro¯ts of the fringe banks, may therefore not please the lead bank. In fact, a
higher iz increases the pro¯ts of the lead bank in the ¯rst period, but it also increases the
pro¯ts of the fringe banks, that may now be used to ¯nance entrants in the second period.









The ¯rst term identi¯es the direct gains from higher ¯rst-period pro¯ts. The second
term identi¯es the indirect costs for the lead bank due to ¯nancial sector growth. Even if
¯nancial sectorgrowth isgood for theeconomy at large, thelead bank dislikestheadditional
competition from the fringe banks. As a consequence, the lead bank has an incentive to
somewhat retard the development of the ¯nancial sector.
While the previous sections focused on the potential advantages of having large and
powerful banks, herewe identify a signi¯cant disadvantage, namely that large and powerful
bankshavea vested interest in preserving industrial monopolies. Theanalysisof thissection
shows that banking competition and industrial competition are likely to go hand in hand.
This ¯nding conforms with our historical analysis that emphasizes the lack of industrial
competition in the countries with large and powerful banks.32
4 The limits of the Gerschenkron-Schumpeter view
The fundamental insight from our model is that for banks to play a role as a catalyst, they
need to be su±ciently large and to have su±cient market power in order to be willing to
32The link between the ¯nancial system and industrial concentration has also been documented by Haber
(1991), but with a di®erent perspective. He looks at the cases of Brazil and Mexico, where underdeveloped
capital markets induced industrial concentration not through banking concentration but by forcing ¯rms to
rely on family wealth and connections for their ¯nancing needs.
22incur the cost of coordination. The power of the theory is thus to identify the conditions
under which wecan orcannot expect banksto taketherole of catalyst for industrialization.
Our theory is consistent with the evidence from Section 2, which focussed on the success
stories of Belgium, Germany and Italy, wherea few largeuniversal banksplayed a signi¯cant
role in promoting industrialization.
In this section we take the theory one step further by confronting it with additional
historic evidence. If our theory is useful in identifying the conditions under which their
argument holds, we now want to concern ourselves with the limits of that argument. We
structurethis analysisin fourparts. First, weconsiderhistoricevidencefromsome countries
that failed to industrialize. Second, we discuss the political economy dimension of having
large and powerful banks. Third, we look at the experience of countries that developed
relying on mechanisms other than coordination by private banks. Fourth, we discuss what
formal empirical evidence exists in the literature, and what additional predictions can be
gained from our model.
4.1 Violating the necessary conditions: evidence from countries that
failed to industrialize
Our theory establishes thenecessary conditions for a bank to be able to act as a catalyst for
industrialization. We now look at what happens when these conditions are violated, and
examine the experience of some countries that failed to industrialize: Russia, Spain, and
pre-1890Italy. Thefailureto industrializecan clearly beattributed to multiplecauses. This
evidencethereforecannot providea de¯nitetest of our theory. What wewant to emphasize,
however, is that the necessary conditions for bank coordination were not satis¯ed in each
of these countries.
Crisp (1967) shows that Russian industrial credit banks developed slowly and remained
small and dispersed over an immense country. The behavior of the Russian state was far
from enticing a catalytic role of banks. The state maintained a tight grip on new economic
activities, and kept limiting the growth of banks. For example, the government viewed
as usury any activity involving a monetary compensation for risk-taking. This attitude
strongly limited how much banks could charge their borrowers, and therefore their market
power.33 Only from the 1890s did banks based in St. Petersburg start engaging in some
industrial credit, but they were many (ten in 1900 and thirteen in 1914), and so there was
much competition, which kept them small.34 The result was a pattern of economic growth
which owed more to the rationalization of agriculture than to industrialization.
33For instance, an attempt to set up a large joint-stock industrial credit bank in Moscow in the 1860s
failed because investors feared to `o®end the authorities.'
34Joint-stock Russian banks totalled 40 in 1893, and 50 in 1914, Crisp (1967), p.197.
23Spain in the second half of the nineteenth century represents another case which illus-
trates the consequences of repressing the activity of industrial banks. While incorporation
was initially subject to governmental approval, it was liberalized after 1856, leading to the
creation of several banks. By 1870about 30 credit companiesand issuebanks had appeared,
and had engaged in commercial banking (Tortella (1972), p.93). Four of thesebecame quite
large. However, they shunned investment in manufacturing ¯rms because of constraints the
government posed on their actions, curtailing their ability to invest in manufacturing, and
encouraging purely speculative investments in railroads and mining companies. Tortella
(1972) forcefully argues that the government's policy impeded a rapid and stable economic
growth. In particular, the government prevented banks from e®ectively coordinating com-
plementary activities: its policy of subsidization of railways while restricting the growth
of manufacturing meant that there were not enough goods to transport, and therefore too
little business for the railways to be pro¯table. In this environment, banks had not enough
power, nor incentives, to engage in investment coordination.
Interestingly, theItalian experience before1890 also lends support to our interpretation.
Polsi (1996) describes how a large number of small banks competed for ¯nancing industry
since the 1860s. They extended little equity ¯nance, and competed also with the six banks
of issue. The situation changed drastically by the mid 1890s. TheBanca d'Italia was set-up
in 1894, and was conferred a monopoly over note issuing. Existing industrial credit banks
collapsed aftera period of speculation. Thecreation of theBanca Commerciale and Credito
Italiano, both much larger than any previous industrial credit bank, brought about a very
di®erent environment.
In all of the cases we can notice that one common trait shared by these countries in
their failures to industrialize: a ¯nancial market structure which was not conduciveto bank
coordination. The example of Italy is also particularly interesting since it uses 'time-series-
like' reasoning as opposed to 'cross-section-like' reasoning to illustrate the insights from
our model. Soon after Italy changed its ¯nancial structure, its banks started engaging in
coordination, as we discussed in Section 2.
4.2 Political economy issues
So far, we have shown that size and market power are necessary conditions for banks to
perform a catalytic role. However, we have not tried to answer the question of where do
these `strong banks' come from. One potential concern with the analysis is that we have
an omitted variable: are `strong banks' merely the result of `strong government?' In other
words, what are the political economy foundations of our analysis?
Clearly government played a role in the industrialization process. However, we would
arguethat in the experienceof thecountries weexamined here, government itself cannot be
24credited for being the catalyst to industrialization.35 Nor were the 'strong' banks directly
created by the government. Nonetheless, there are some interesting interactions between
the banks and the government worth noticing. The threeepisodes of rapid industrialization
all occurred in a period of relative political stability. Government therefore can be credited
for providing an environment that allowed the catalyst activity to unfold.
While stable governments provided a suitable environment for catalytic activities, the
emergence of strong banks should not be attributed to these governments. In Belgium,
the emergence of strong banks was mostly a historic coincidence. The Dutch king Wilhem
I created the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale shortly before Belgium's independence in 1830. While the
King bought a large part of the shares and retained the right to nominate its governor,
the bank was fundamentally a private corporation (Chlepner (1926)). The new Belgian
government quickly agreed to the founding of a second largebank, theBanquedeBelgique,
to counterbalance the power of the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale.
In Germany, Kreditbanken were promoted by Privatbankiers who found their partner-
ships insu±ciently capitalized to e®ectively ¯nance heavy industry. The creation of these
'strong banks' occurred almost in spite of the Prussian government, which was suspicious
of new banks for fear of losing control over monetary policy (Riesser (1911)). The earliest
Kreditbank, the Schaa®hausen, was born by incorporation of an illiquid large Privatbankier,
A. Schaa®hausen & Co., whose creditors brought the government to grant a joint-stock
bank charter only for fear of a ¯nancial crisis (Pohl (1982)). Another Kreditbank, the
DarmstÄ adter, could not be based in the ¯nancial capital of Frankfurt, where other tradi-
tionally minded Privatbankiers controlled thecity Senateand had just refused anotherbank
charter. The government's opposition to banks also prevented its promoters to set it up in
their own town, KÄ oln. Eventually they set it up in Darmstadt, in the neighboring Grand
Duchy of Hesse, which was willing to charter an industrial credit bank (Cameron (1956)).
It took thePrussian government another twenty years before it accepted joint-stock banks,
and only in reaction to their increasing success in neighboring states.
In Italy theinitiativetocreatestrongbankscamefromprivatebankersand entrepreneurs,
with no government interference (Confalonieri (1976), vol. II). TheBanca Commercialewas
created in 1894 by six German Kreditbanken which wanted to takean activerole in exploit-
ing Italy's industrial potential. Their endeavor received no government support, neither
from Italy nor from Germany. The Credito Italiano was then the response of private Italian
bankers and entrepreneurs. Again the government did not play a role in its creation.
Thisevidence showsthat `strong banks' arenot merely theresult of `strong government.'
Once these banks established themselves as leading players in the economy, however, close
35In the next section, we discuss the case of Korea, where the government took a more active and direct
role.
25interaction with the government became inevitable. This involved both give and take.
In Belgium thre was a delicate political balance between the large banks and the gov-
ernment. When the government created the Banque Nationale in 1850 it was a deliberate
move to take away control of monetary policy from the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale and the Banque
de Belgique. Even within the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale there was a delicate task of balancing polit-
ical in°uence. The board of the Soci¶ et¶ e G¶ en¶ erale maintained a bipartisan structure, where
both leading parties maintained board seats, irrespectively of which party was currently in
power (Chlepner (1930)). In Germany Kreditbanken could sometime exert pressure on the
government, often asking for protection and support for their clients. They pursued favor-
able charter conditions for clients who wanted to incorporate, and diplomatic assistance to
their clients in the export sector (Riesser (1911)). In Italy, the board members of Banca
Commerciale and Credito Italiano spent considerable time and energy in dealing with the
government when engineering ¯nancial operations involving large companies, as reported
in several instances by Confalonieri (1976,1982). This behavior represented an instance of
mutual control and in°uence between banks and government.
Aspectsof political economy arethereforeimportant forunderstanding theroleof banks
as catalysts for industrialization in emerging markets, and deserve further attention. An
important task for future research is to better understand the political economy of how
a private institution engaging in industrial promotion interacts with government in the
process of industrialization.
4.3 Alternative catalysts for industrialization
To round o® our discussion of the view of Gerschenkron and Schumpeter, it is worthwhile
to brie°y mention two further quali¯cations of our argument, a full development of which
is beyond the scope of this paper. First, private banks are one possible solution to the
coordination problem, but they areby nomeans the only possibleone. Second, coordination
may not even be the problem hampering industrialization.
Wehaveseen that the main argument of Gerschenkron and Schumpeter revolves around
the successful industrialization of a number of continental European countries with the as-
sistance of few large universal banks with market power. We have also seen that in some
other countries the absence of such banks coincides with protracted delays of industrializa-
tion. In a number of other emerging markets, however, institutional mechanismsother than
private banks have been used for the coordination of investments.
First, large ¯rms or industrial groups|conglomerates|may exploit complementarities
internally (see Khanna (2002)). Probably the most interesting case in this respect is Japan
before World War II. Fruin (1992) and Morikawa (1992), among others, document the role
of the Zaibatsus in fostering and coordinating industrialization. Zaibatsus were family-
26dominated conglomerates centered around a trading company which commercialized the
products of member ¯rms. Therefore Zaibatsus grew by focusing on `trading' complemen-
tarities among their own companies. Their pattern of development thus contrasted with the
European casesofbank coordinated growth, which relied on theexploitation of technological
complementarities across industrial sectors. Interestingly, in the pre-war period Japanese
regulations forced banks to limit their action to short-term lending and also limited the size
and power of its banking institutions (see Patrick (1967)).
A second alternative is government coordination. A country that exempli¯es this well is
Korea. The Korean government of General Park implemented a coordinated allocation of
resources for industrialization which led to a quick industrialization during the 1960s and
1970s, as described by Cho (1989) and Wade (1986). To implement the coordination of
investment the government obviously still needs some implementing agent. In the case of
Korea, the government nationalized all banks and used them as instruments of economic
policy, especially in connection with subsidized credit directed totarget sectors, asexamined
by Cho and Hellmann (1994).
The view of Gerschenkron and Schumpeter applies only to economies that su®er from a
coordination problem. Our theory is therefore explicitly targeted at examining how banks
can coordinate industrial investments. Coordination is likely to be most important for
`catch-up' economies, and, as argued forcefully by Matsuyama (1995b), it becomes less im-
portant as the economy approaches the `technological frontier.' The best example of an
economy that is believed to have industrialized near the technological frontier is, of course,
Britain, which led the ¯rst Industrial Revolution. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) hold that
experimentation and risk diversi¯cation were the crucial problems Britain had to solve to
become the ¯rst country to industrialize. They argue that the fragmented British banking
sector wasactually instrumental forsustaining experimentation and diversi¯cation. Clearly,
this fragmented structure also implied that the necessary conditions for bank coordination
were not satis¯ed. Also the industrialization of the United States during the latter part
of the eighteenth century owed little to industrial credit banks, whose development was
restricted by tight regulation (Roe (1994)). However, in the US case the size of the internal
market and the geographic extension of the economy made its industrialization very dif-
ferent from that of Britain or of continental Europe. Indeed, Chandler (1977) shows that,
because of its unique geography, the development of railways provided a focal point for the
development of the US industrial structure.
4.4 Testable hypotheses
We begin our paper with a historical motivation, which contains the puzzling observation
that banks seems to have played a catalytic role in the industrialization of some countries,
27but not of others. We then develop a theoretical model that explains underwhat conditions
we can expect banks to play such a role of catalyst. The model provides a conceptual
framework that helps us to better understand the historical evidence and to assess its
interpretation by Schumpeter and Gerschenkron. But our model also yields interesting
empirical predictions that could be tested empirically.
A ¯rst prediction of the model is that higher banking concentration favors industrial-
ization. Our analysis in sections 2 and 4.1 provides anedoctal historic evidence which is
consistent with this hypothesis. A second prediction of the model that is also consistent
with this evidence is that while concentration in banking favors growth in the early stages
of industrialization, in later stages it can also lead to a stronger industrial concentration.
Formal econometric tests could be developed to confront these predictions with empir-
ical evidence. For example, one could employ either industry segments or countries as the
unit of analysis. For younger industries (or less industrialized countries) we would expect a
positive relationship between banking concentration and industrial growth. Related to this,
wewould also expect a positiverelationship between banking concentration and innovation,
which might be measured with patents or R&D expenditure, orbetween banking concentra-
tion and ¯rm natality rates. For more mature industries (or more industrialized countries),
we would expect a positive relationship between banking concentration and industrial con-
centration. This higherindustrial concentration may also lead to less innovation, lower ¯rm
natality, and lower industrial growth.
In a recent paper, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) perform some closely related tests.
They do not look at industrialization per se, but instead use data from 36 manufactur-
ing industries in 41 industrialized countries over the 1980-1990 period. Their ¯ndings are
supportive of our hypotheses. Indeed, their main result is that concentrated banking is as-
sociated with higher growth rates in industries with younger ¯rms, whereas it is associated
with lower growth rates in industries with more established ¯rms. Also the results of Beck
and Levine (2002) conform to the predictions of our theory. They ¯nd that ¯rm natality
rates increase with ¯nancial development, so that one should observe increased enterprise
formation once catalytic banks start operating, but a slowdown once their e®orts to retard
¯nancial development unfold.
There may be several reasons why concentrated banking leads to such a pattern of
industrial growth. Petersen and Rajan (1995), for example, argue that ¯nancing a new
¯rm entails risks that can only be compensated in an on-going relationship. Too much
competition may undermine relationship banking if it makes it too easy for a successful
¯rm to exit a relationship.
Such a relationship-based explanation is complementary to ours. Themain di®erence is
that our approach does not rely on the interaction of one bank with one ¯rm. Our theory
28thus provides a `macro' perspective and looks at bank portfolios, rather than at individual
relationships. In the relationship model, if a bank incurs initial investment losses, it needs
to later recover those from the same client. In our model, however, it is possible that the
bank makes losses on some clients, as long as these investments help the bank to make
pro¯ts from investments in other clients with complementary businesses.
Ourmacro perspectiveallowsusto derivesomeadditional empirical implicationsbeyond
those already tested by Petersen and Rajan. In particular, it predicts that theportfolios of
the large catalytic banks should di®er systematically from those of the other smaller banks.
Smallerindustrial banks should in fact havewell-diversi¯ed portfoliosacross industries. The
larger industrial banks, however, should have portfolios that are concentrated on a set of
¯rmswhich sharesigni¯cant externalities. Such a portfolioislikely tobelessdiversi¯ed. Our
model also predicts that large banks should invest in a large number of industry pioneers,
as opposed to industry followers. Moreover, because of the losses from investments in a
critical mass of pioneers, the larger industrial banks should be less pro¯table than their
smaller competitors.
Some recent empirical work on the role of German Kreditbanken, surveyed by Edwards
and Ogilvie (1996) and Guinnanne (2001), looks at the later stages of German industrial-
ization, i.e the period from 1880 to 1914. This work provides some preliminary evidence
that supports the predictions of the model. Edwards and Ogilvie (1996), for instance, note
that, as the German economy grew, Kreditbanken remained heavily specialized in industrial
¯nance and did not branch out into other fast growing segments of the ¯nancial market
such as, for example, private mortgages. Indeed, in 1900 Kreditbanken still accounted for
only 17% of the ¯nancial sector (Goldsmith (1969), p.514). Also, Kreditbanken focussed
mostly on joint stock companies (Aktiengesellschaften), a category which constituted only
a relatively small sharein overall industrial capital: 10% in 1880 and 16% in 1900 (Ho®man
(1965, p.785)).36 While this evidence is suggestive, our theory provides a framework for
more conclusive formal tests to be carried out in future analyses of the portfolio structures
of these banks.
Finally, ourmodel also providesanew set of predictions about theuseof equity ¯nancing
and the role of universal banks. First, our model predicts that universal banks should have
36The work of Caroline Fohlin also provides some interesting evidence in this respect. Fohlin (1998a)
notes that Kreditbanken's clients became less dependent on external ¯nance over time: The ratio of liquid
to ¯xed assets of established joint-stock companies rose from below 30% in the 1880s to 60% in 1912 (and
from less than 10% to 50% for recently listed ones). These ¯ndings con¯rm WellhÄ oner's (1989) case studies
of nine large industrial companies, and Feldenkirchen's (1982, 1985) accounts of ¯nancing patterns in heavy
industries. Moreover, Fohlin (1998b) shows that ¯rms which borrowed from Kreditbanken did not bene¯t
from lowerliquidityconstraints than other ¯rms. In her sample of75 ¯rms listed on the Berlinstockexchange
between 1880 and 1913, bank-attached ¯rms were at times more dependent on cash °ow for the ¯nancing
of their investment than bank-independent ¯rms. Fohlin (1998c) ¯nds similar results for a sample of 170
Italian ¯rms ¯nanced by the Banca Commerciale Italiana between 1903 and 1911.
29a competitive advantage over banks that are restricted to pure loan ¯nancing, especially
in new industries that require some kind of catalytic coordination. One could then test
whether such industries develop faster in emerging markets which allow universal banking.
The model also predicts that the minimum size of a catalytic bank is lower if the bank can
makeequity investments. Asa consequence, therelationship between bankingconcentration
and industrial growth should be less pronounced in cases where banks are allowed to hold
equity.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we provide a new theory of the role of banks as catalysts for industrializa-
tion in emerging economies. Our theory formalizes the view of Gerschenkron, Schumpeter
and others who studied the industrialization of some continental European countries. We
introduce banks into a model of the big push to examine under what circumstances pro¯t-
motivated banks would engage in the coordination of industrial investments. The model
establishes a theoretical link between the roleof banks as catalysts forindustrialization and
the necessity of market powerfor these banks. A potential cost of catalyticbanks, however,
is excessive industrial concentration. The theory also shows why universal banking helps
to reduce the (endogenous) cost of coordination, thus improving the e±ciency of banks as
catalysts. We use the model to interpret a diverse set of observations on the role of banks
in the industrialization of emerging economies. We show that in cases where banks took
an active role in promoting industrialization we also ¯nd that the necessary conditions de-
rived form theory|most notably market power in banking|are satis¯ed. We also discuss
a number of cases where the lack of industrialization seems at least in part related to a
violation of these necessary conditions. These examples help sharpen our understanding of
when the Gerschenkron-Schumpeter view does or does not apply. We then consider some
alternative catalysts, such as the government or industrial conglomerates. Finally, we spell
out several predictions of the model which can be formally tested.
The debate about the role of banks in industrialization is not merely a historical issue,
but central to the debate about the role of banks in emerging markets. On the one hand,
ouranalysis highlights theimportanceof a creativeroleof banks. It remindsus that in some
of the most successful emerging economies, banks played a creative role in the promotion
of new industries. On theother hand, our analysis also warns against someof the potential
costs. In particular, it shows that the very conditions necessary to allow private banks to
promotecoordinated investments|namely size and market power|also imply an ine±cient
oligopolisticmarket structure, which may fosterindustrial concentration and retard growth
once coordination has been achieved.
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Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Since each entrepreneur needs to borrow the same amount of capital, contracts di®er
only with respect to the interest rates. Suppose L o®ers a set of debt contracts fiqg to
entrepreneurs q = 1;:::; M, that satis¯es ¼(q; iq)=W. The interest rate on each contract
iq is chosen so that if all entrepreneurs with a lower q start a venture, then entrepreneur
q also ¯nds it worthwhile to do so. Thus each entrepreneur in the critical mass is o®ered
a di®erent contract. Choose i1 such that ¼(1; i1) =W. Then, entrepreneur q =1 always
starts a ¯rm, irrespective of other entrepreneurs' decisions. Entrepreneur q = 2 knows
this. Then choose i2 such that ¼(2;i2) =W. Entrepreneur q =2 thus starts a new ¯rm
irrespective of what entrepreneurs q = 3;:::;Q do. Similarly for entrepreneur q = 3;:::; M.
With this inductive chain we ¯nd that all entrepreneurs q=1; ::::;M start a venture. Note
that this is a simultaneous move game: The optimal o®er of L does not rely on sequential
moves, but only on a consistent chain of beliefs. Once M entrepreneurs start ventures, all
other entrepreneurs|by de¯nition|¯nd it worthwhile to do so as well. Therefore the only
equilibrium left is theEME, where all entrepreneurs, q=1;::::::Qstart a venture. L isthus
a catalyst for emerging markets.
The next step is to show that while fiqg allows L to induce coordination, it makes it
costly for L to act as a catalyst. Consider an alternative set of contracts that has exactly
one interest rate higher than in the set fiqg. Denote the di®erent contract i0
q, which is
o®ered to some entrepreneur q0. We know that fi0
qg is such that all entrepreneurs with
q<q0 always start a venture. Now entrepreneur q0 will do so only if at least some other
entrepreneurs with q >q0 do|as the interest rate i0
q is too high to make a new venture
attractiveotherwise. This impliesmultiple equilibria: If all entrepreneurs with q>q0 expect
entrepreneur q0 not to start a venture, they will not do so either. This creates a self-ful¯lling
belief which makes it optimal for q0 not to start a venture. Obviously, if all entrepreneurs
with q>q0 expect entrepreneur q0 to start a venture, they will form a positive self-ful¯lling
belief, which makes it optimal for q0 to start a venture. In this case the EME occurs.
But if L raises the interest rates it charges on even only one contract, not starting a new
venture remains a possibility, and thus coordination|de¯ned by the elimination of the
SQE|is not achieved. This proves that fiqg is the most pro¯table set of contracts L is
able to o®er in order to induce coordination. But since ¼(M;r) < W, and iq · r for all
q=1; ::::;M, the latter inequality must be strict for at least one q. Therefore, L does not
earn a pro¯t on any of these loans, and takes a loss on at least oneof them. Formally, using
¼(q; iq)=¯[f(q) ¡(1+iq)X]=W, we get:Ã =
M X
q=1




(ii) In order for L to o®er the contract fiqg, it must be overall pro¯table to do so:
½L=º+Ã¸0. The value of º isdetermined by market clearing. Theinterest rate charged to
entrepreneurs outside the critical mass, say iz, is determined by the condition ¼(Q;iz)=W,
and it is the same whether the lender is L or one of the investors in the competitive fringe.
In this simple model with homogeneous entrepreneurs investors extract all the rents from
coordination, as long as z<Q¡M. Since ¼(Q; r)>W by assumption, it follows that iz >r,
and º =(Q¡M¡z)[¯(1+iz)X ¡X] = (Q¡M¡z)[¯f(Q)¡F]. It follows that there exists
a critical level b z<Q¡M, such that L o®ers fiqg if and only if z<b z.
(iii) Entrepreneurs in the critical mass all pay a cost of capital lower than the market
rate, i.e., iq <r, but outside the critical mass entrepreneurs face a cost of capital higher
than the market rate iz >r. Since L makes non-negative pro¯ts ½L by lending X to (Q¡z)
entrepreneurs, its entrepreneurs face an average cost of capital equal to r+ ½L
(Q¡z)X ¸ r.
Moreover, the entrepreneurs ¯nanced by investors in the competitive fringe pay a cost of
capital equal to iz >r. Therefore the average cost of capital to entrepreneurs is strictly
higher than r. 2
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) ¡(iii) If L ¯nances an entrepreneur q by holding a share ® of its equity in addition to
a loan, then the entrepreneur's pro¯t is given by:
¼(K;i; ®) =¯(1¡®) [(f(K)¡(1+i)X]
and L's (net) pro¯t by:
½q =¯®[(f(K)¡(1+i)X] +¯(1+i)X ¡X
As in the case with pure debt contracts, in order to achieve coordination, L needs to o®er
a set of contracts fiq; ®g that will induce all entrepreneurs in the critical mass to start a
venture, i.e., ¼(q;iq; ®) = W for all q=1;:::; M. The proof that investor coordination is
feasible is then the same as before. We then show that equity ¯nance makes coordination
less costly. From ¼(q; iq;®)=W we get ¯(1¡®)(1+iq)X =¯(1¡®)f(q)¡W, so that we
can write ½q =¯®f(Q)+¯(1¡®)f(q)¡W ¡X =(¯f(q)¡F)+®¯(f(Q)¡f(q)). The ¯rst
term is negative and represents the loss the investor su®ers from ¯nancing entrepreneurs inthe critical mass. The second term is positiveand represents the pro¯t from holding equity
and sharing in the appreciation of entrepreneurs' value as coordination shifts beliefs from
pessimistic (K=q) to optimistic (K=Q). It is immediate that the larger ® the larger is
this second term, and so the lower is the cost of coordination Ã. In turn, the lower the
coordination cost Ã, the larger b z|the largest size of the competitive fringe which makes
coordination by L feasible. For ¯rms outside the critical mass, L extracts all the pro¯ts
as in the case of pure debt contracts. Hence, ½L increases monotonically in ® and L will
always prefer to ¯nance ¯rms with equity contracts.
(iv) ¡(v) If there is no limit to the extent of equity that investors can hold, then from
(iii) L will ¯nance entrepreneurs only with equity. In this case, the amount of equity L
holds in each venture in thecritical mass is given by ¯(1¡®)f(q)=W, so that ®=1¡ W
¯f(q).









We then have Ã ·0 for F · b F =¯f(Q)¡W ¡
M. Note that ¯f(Q)¡ b F >0, so that Ã ·0 is
always possible in the feasible range for F. Similarly, Ã¸0 for E·c W= M
¡ (¯f(Q)¡F). 2
A model with incentive and coordination problems
Consider the following production function: f(K;e;!) = g(K)e!, where g(K) is an
increasing function of K (measuring the complementarity e®ect), e is the entrepreneur's
e®ort, and ! is a random variable with distribution - over the interval [0;1). Let c(e) be
the entrepreneur's private costs of exerting e®ort, with c(0)=c0(0)=0, c0(e) >0 for e>0,
c0(e) ! 1 for e ! 1 and c00 <0 for all e, so that the optimal e is bounded away from 0




¯[f(q; e¤;!) ¡¾q(f(q;e¤; !))]d-(!) ¡c(e¤)
where e¤ =argmax uE(q; ¾q) is chosen to maximize this expression. Similarly, denote the





where e¤ is chosen as before to maximize uE(q;¾q). The optimal contract for entrepreneur
q in the critical mass maximizes ½L
q =uI(Q;¾q)¡X¡t, subject to uE(q; ¾q)+t=W, where
t is a monetary transfer from L to the entrepreneur.37
37For all the ¯rms outside the critical mass, the optimal contract is simply found by maximizing ½q =
uI(Q;¾q)¡X¡t, subject to uE(Q;¾q)+t =W. This simpli¯es to the standard principal-agent problem of
maximizing
R 1
0 ¯f(Q; e; !)d-(!)¡F ¡c(e).The optimal security ¾¤
q that solves the above maximization problem depends on the
distribution of !, and the private costs c(e), and may well be highly non-linear. We now
show that the main insights of the model are nonetheless preserved:
Proposition 5 If L uses the optimal security ¾¤
q, then:
(i) for F su±ciently large, inducing coordination is costly: Ã<0;
(ii) there exists a critical value b z such that L induces coordination if and only if the
competitive fringe has size z<b z.
Proof. We ¯rst show that uE(q; ¾¤
q)< u E(Q; ¾¤
q), i.e., that uE increases in q. To see why,
suppose it does not. This would imply that uE also does not increase in e, since g(K) and
e increase f(:) in the same manner.38 But this would imply e=0, and thus f =0, which is
never optimal.
The above inequality implies that L cannot capture all of the rents from inducing co-
ordination. As a consequence we can ¯nd F su±ciently large (while keeping W constant)
so that L makes a loss on ¯nancing an entrepreneur in the critical mass. Formally, let
u´
R 1





By choosing F su±ciently large we can thus ensure that Ã=
PM
q=1 ½L
q <0. But note that F
may be chosen so that F <u, so that the EME is still preferable to the SQE equilibrium.
We have thus shown part (i). Part (ii) follows in the usual way. 2
Therefore, the model with optimal non-linear contracts and incentives, while being an-
alytically less tractable, closely matches our base model in all important aspects.
A general model of complementarities with heterogeneous ¯rms
We now present a model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs which allows for a wide
variety of complementarities. We show how the insights of our base model carry over to a
much more general setting.
We modify the model of the main text by allowing each ¯rm to have a di®erent prof-
itability, and a di®erent impact on other ¯rms' pro¯tability. Let Iq =1 if an entrepreneur
decides to set up a new venture q, and Iq =0 otherwise. Denote the set of all such de-
cisions by K =fIqgq2Q, which forms a sub-lattice. Let k Kk be the corresponding number
38While we have chose the simplest possible functional form for f(:), all we need is that it is monotone
increasing in both g(:) and e.of entrepreneurs who set up a ¯rm or, equivalently, the number of new ¯rms created.39
The (gross) return f(K) for any particular venture q is given by f(K), where K is now a
vector. The fundamental assumption we make is that there are non-negative externalities
between ¯rms. The most general such assumption is to only stipulate that f(K) is super-
modular in K.40. This implies that for any K1 µK2 the returns to ¯rm q are such that:
f(K1;q) · f(K2;q). Using pure debt contracts, the present value of the pro¯ts from ¯rm
q is given by:
¼(K;q; i) = ¯[f(K;q) ¡(1+i)X]
where entrepreneur q expects the set K[q of new ¯rms. Asin themain text, we assumethat
all entrepreneurs have the same endowment W and require the same amount of external
funding X=F¡W, although it is straightforward to relax this assumption. Entrepreneur q
sets up a new ¯rm whenever ¼(K;q; i)¸W. A set of ¯rms K is a competitive equilibrium if
¼(K;q; r)¸W for all q2K and ¼(K;q; r)<W for all q2QnK. We denote the equilibrium
sets of ¯rms by Kn, n =1; :::; N, where N is the number of competitive equilibria.
Proposition 6 (i) With a competitive ¯nancial market there may exist multiple equilibria.
(ii) There always exists a `maximal' equilibrium in which all the entrepreneurs that set
up a new ¯rm in at least one equilibrium Kn do set up a ¯rm. It Pareto dominates all other
equilibria.
(iii) There always exists a `minimal' equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs that do not
set up anew ¯rm in at least one equilibrium Kn donot set up a ¯rm. It is Pareto dominated
by all other equilibria.
(iv) In the `maximal' equilibrium there are (weakly) less entrepreneurs setting up a ¯rm
than in an utilitarian social welfare optimum.
Proof. (i) The possibility of multiple equilibria is established by the example in the main
text, and trivially extends to the general case when thesimplifying assumptions of identical
entrepreneurs and simple complementarity we use in the main text are dropped. The
equivalent result is also derived in Milgrom and Roberts (1990a, 1994a, 1994b).
(ii) Consider any two equilibria Ki and Kj, i 6= j which are not nested, i.e., Kij ´
KinKj 6= ;, and Kji ´ KjnKi 6= ;. By the de¯nition of equilibrium, for all q 2 Ki we
39For a de¯nition and discussion of sub-lattices see Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Notice that our model
could be extended to the more general case where entrepreneurs also choose the level of investment, so that
Iq is an interval rather than a binary function. All that is required is that the set of investment decisions K
forms a sub-lattice.
40For a de¯nition and discussion of supermodularity, see Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1994a) and Milgrom
and Shannon (1994).have ¼(Ki;q; r) ¸ W so that ¼(Ki [ Kj;q; r) ¸ W. Similarly, for all q 2 Kj we have
¼(Kj; q;r)¸W so that ¼(Kj [ Kj;q; r)¸W. Then there exists some set Kn ¶ (Ki [ Kj)
such that ¼(Kn; q;r) ¸¼(Ki [ Kj;q; r)¸W for all q2 (Ki[Kj), and ¼(Kn;q; r)¸W for
all q 2 Kn, and ¼(Kn; q;r) <W for all q 2 QnKn. This shows that for any non-nested
equilibria there exists an equilibrium (Kn) where all entrepreneurs setting up a ¯rm in
either equilibrium do invest as well. We denote the largest such equilibrium by KEME, or
simply EME. The EME Pareto dominates all other equilibria since investors make zero
pro¯ts, the largest number of entrepreneurs are setting up a new ¯rm, and ¯rms can only
have a positive externalities on others' pro¯ts.
(iii) Consider any two equilibria Ki and Kj, i 6=j which are not nested, i.e., Kij ´
KinKj 6=;, and Kji´KjnKi6=;. For all q 2 Kij wehave¼(Kj; q;r)<W. Similarly, for all
q 2 Kji we have ¼(Ki; q;r)<W. Thus, for all q2Kij [ Kji we have ¼(Ki\Kj;q; r)<W.
The above inequalities imply that there exists some set ; µ K0 µ (Ki\Kj) such that
¼(K0;q; r)·¼[Ki\Kj; q;r) <W for all q2(Kij[Kji), ¼(K0; q;r)<W for all q2QnK0,
and ¼(K0;q; r)¸W for all q2K0. This shows that for any two non-nested equilibria there
exists an equilibrium where no entrepreneur in their non-overlapping subsets is included.
We denote the smallest such equilibrium by KSQE, or simply SQE. The SQE is Pareto
inferior to all other equilibria since it is the one with the fewest entrepreneurs setting up a
new ¯rm.
(iv) There cannot be too many entrepreneurs setting up a ¯rm in KEME since every
entrepreneur is individually pro¯table, and any one ¯rm can only havepositiveexternalities
on all others. Suppose next an entrepreneur q0 2 QnKEME were to set up a ¯rm as well.
The de¯nition of KEME implies that q0 takes a loss. But by assumption 1 the investment
by q0 (weakly) raises f(KEME;q; r) to f(KEME[q0; q;r) for all q 2 KEME. Depending on
the strength of the complementarity e®ect, captured by the function f(:), it may be socially
e±cient to have more entrepreneurs setting up a ¯rm than in KEME. 2
We now want to examine the conditions under which L engages in coordination. In
order to prove it we introduce a few de¯nitions and two lemmata. We have to use a more
sophisticated de¯nition of what it means to achieve coordination and what constitutes a
critical mass than in the main text. We assume that in the absence of coordination the
`minimal' equilibrium occurs. A reasonable notion of `achieving coordination' is that at
least all (and possibly more, for reasons explained below) entrepreneurs in the `maximal'
equilibrium set up a ¯rm. The following propositions will thus focus on achieving (at
least) KEME, and the critical mass that enables this. However, we provide a more general
de¯nition of critical mass for any equilibrium K, and it is straightforward to extend the
propositions below to any other equilibrium, using this more general de¯nition of critical
mass.Critical Mass. Intuitively, a critical mass M relative to some set K is a set M(K) such
that conditional on all entrepreneurs in M(K) setting up a ¯rm, all entrepreneurs in K
¯nd it pro¯table to set up a ¯rm. Moreover, M(K) is the smallest such set, i.e., the above
property fails to hold if any one entrepreneur is dropped from M(K). For any K there
may be several critical masses Ms(K), s=1; :::; S. Note also that Ms(K) may be a subset
of K, contain some elements outside K, or it may even be that all elements of Ms(K) are
outside of K. More formally, M(K) is a critical mass for K if it satis¯es the following two
conditions:
(i) Forany set K0 ¶M(K) that satis¯es ¼(K0; q;r)¸W for all q2M(K) and ¼(K0;q; r)<W
for all q2QnK0, it is true that K0¶K.
(ii) There does not exist any M0(K)½M(K) that satis¯es property (i).
Let Ms(K), s=1;:::; S be all the critical masses for K. We de¯neMmin(K) as theonewith
fewest elements.
CatalyticLoan Set. A catalyticloan set forM(K) isa set of interest ratesfim(q)gq2M(K),
such that Iq =1 for all q 2 M(K) is the only equilibrium for all entrepreneurs in M(K)
when they hold `pessimistic' beliefs that all entrepreneurs outside of M(K) and KSQE are
not setting up a new ¯rm. We denotea `catalyticloan set' by »(M). The de¯nition of SQE
implies that even with pessimistic beliefs agents assume that all entrepreneurs in KSQE set
up a ¯rm. The above de¯nition also does not require all entrepreneurs in M(K) to have
the belief that nobody in M(K) is setting up a ¯rm. Instead it asks for an equilibrium
of beliefs for all entrepreneurs in M(K), such as the one we constructed for proposition 2.
Whenever it is not confusing, we will write M instead of M(K).
Our de¯nition of critical mass ensures that even if entrepreneurs initially have beliefs con-
sistent with the SQE, the critical mass can break these beliefs as it forces all remaining
equilibria to have the property that at least all entrepreneurs in K set up a new ¯rm. Ob-
viously, there may be more entrepreneurs investing, either as part of M or even outside of
M and K.41 The de¯nition of the critical mass is obviously directly related to thenotion of
inducing coordination. In particular, L can induce coordination (in the sense of achieving
an equilibrium that has all entrepreneurs in KEME setting up a ¯rm) wheneverit mobilizes
a critical mass M(KEME). We are now ready to state our two lemmata.
41Our de¯nition of a critical mass is demanding. Starting from the most pessimistic belief, it must be
that K is the only equilibrium. If everybody in the economy had an initial belief that some intermediate
equilibrium between the minimal and the maximal was being played, then a smaller critical mass would
su±ce to induce the maximal one. The point we make is that this smaller mass would indeed only work if
the initial belief is this intermediate equilibrium. But if it turns out that the initial belief was the minimal,
then any "smaller critical mass" will fail to induce coordination to the maximal. By contrast, our critical
mass will induce K irrespective of the initial expectations.Lemma 2 For any critical mass M(K) and any catalytic loan set »(M) L makes losses on
all entrepreneurs in M(K).
Proof. Since we are dealing with the critical mass for any set K we simply write M
instead of M(K). First notice that a necessary{but not su±cient{condition for a set of
interest rates to form a catalytic loan set »(M) is to make it worth setting up a ¯rm by
all entrepreneurs in M. Formally, we need that ¯[f(KSQE[M; q) ¡(1+im(q))X]¸W for
all q2 M. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that L makes pro¯ts on some
q0 2M, i.e., im(q0)>r then ¯[f(KSQE[M; q0) ¡(1 +im(q0)X]¸W which is equivalent to
f(KSQE[M; q0) ¸(1 +im(q0))X +(1 +r)E >(1 +r)F. Consider the set M0 =Mnq0, and
supposethat all entrepreneurs in M0 set up a ¯rm. Then q0 will also havean incentive to set
up a ¯rm, since f(KSQE[M0;q0)=f(KSQE[M); q0)>(1+r)F. But this means that when
all entrepreneurs in M0 set up a ¯rm, also all entrepreneurs in M, and so all entrepreneurs
in K, do set up a ¯rm. In other words, M0 is a critical mass for K. Since M0 ½M, this
contradicts the claim that M is a critical mass. 2
The intuition of Lemma 1 is that if L were to make pro¯ts on any entrepreneur in M,
then it could drop this entrepreneur, and have her be ¯nanced by the fringe investors.
Lemma 3 Consider any equilibrium K for which L ¯nances M(K) with a catalytic loan
set »(M(K)). Then the investors in the competitive fringe ¯nance the z most pro¯table
entrepreneurs of KnM(K).
Proof. The proof consists of showing that L would indeed make lower pro¯ts should it
choose to competeaway someof themost pro¯tableentrepreneurs from thefringeinvestors.
For each q 2 KnM de¯ne a mapping from q to ' such that f(K;'1) ¸ f(K;'2) ¸::: ¸
f(K;'kKnMk), where n = 1;:::; kKnMk. First suppose that L leaves the ¯nancing of the
z most pro¯table entrepreneurs to the investors in the competitive fringe. These investors
will maximize their pro¯ts by charging the same interest rate iz de¯ned by: ¯[f(K;'z) ¡
(1 +iz)X] =W to entrepreneurs 'n, n=1; :::;z. L maximizes its own pro¯ts by charging
il(q) such that ¯[f(K; 'n) ¡ (1 + il('n))X] = W to entrepreneurs n=z +1;:::; kKnMk.
Suppose next L decides to competefor one single entrepreneur 'n0, with n0·z. In this case
L has to o®er entrepreneur 'n0 thesame interest rate(or ² less) than the fringe investors, or
else its o®er will be refused. The fringe investors now charge iz de¯ned by ¯[f(K;'z+1) ¡
(1 + iz)X] = W to entrepreneurs 'n, n = 1;:::; n0 ¡ 1; n0 + 1;::::z + 1. L charges il(q)
satisfying ¯[f(K; 'n)+(1+il('n)X]=W to entrepreneurs 'n, n=z+2; :::;kKnMk. Thus
L gets the same return on entrepreneurs n=z +2;:::; kKnMk, and ¯nances entrepreneur
'n0 instead of entrepreneur 'z+1, making zero pro¯ts in both cases. As a consequence L
is indi®erent between competing away one entrepreneur from the fringe or not. Withoutloss of generality we assume it does not. Next, suppose L decides to compete for exactly
two entrepreneurs 'n0 and 'n00, with n0 <n00 ·z. L must o®er these two entrepreneurs the
same interest rates (or ² less) than the fringe investor, or else its o®ers will be refused. The
fringe investorsnow charge iz de¯ned by ¯[f(K;'z+2)¡(1+iz)X]=W to all entrepreneurs
'n, n=1;::; n0 ¡1;n0 +1;::::n00 ¡1;n00 +1; :::;z+2. L charges il(q) satisfying ¯[f(K;'n)+
(1 +il('n)X] =W to all entrepreneurs 'n, n=z +3;:::; kKnMk. We now ask whether
L increases its pro¯ts by ¯nancing entrepreneurs n0 and n00 instead of leaving them to the
fringe. By competing, L gets thesame return on all entrepreneurs 'n, n=z+3;:::; kKnMk,
and ¯nancesentrepreneurs n0 and n00 instead of entrepreneurs z+1 and z+2. In the former
case it receives on both entrepreneurs an interest rate il(z +2) de¯ned by ¯[f(K; 'z+2) ¡
(1+il(z+2))X]=W. In the latter case it receives a rate il(z+1) de¯ned by ¯[f(K; 'z+1)¡
(1 +il(z +1))X] =W on entrepreneur n0, plus a rate il(z +2) de¯ned by ¯[f(K; 'z+2) ¡
(1+il(z+2))X]=W on n00. L is then clearly worse o® when it tries to compete the better
entrepreneurs away from the fringe. The same argument applies if L chooses to compete
away from the fringe more than two entrepreneurs. We thus conclude that L leaves all the
z most pro¯table entrepreneurs to the fringe. 2
Suppose now that L is committed to achieving coordination. Denote the equilibrium that
results from its optimal choice of a critical mass, given a fringe of size z, by K¤
z . Beyond
¯nancing a critical mass, L may also ¯nancesome moreentrepreneurs. We denote theset of
these entrepreneurs by Y which satis¯es Y ´K¤
znfM(K¤
z )[ Zg. L makes an overall pro¯t
on Y by charging an interest rateil(q)) satisfying ¯[f(K¤
z; q)¡(1+il(q))X] = W. Assuming














Proposition 7 Suppose investors only use pure debt contracts.
(i) Coordination is feasible if and only if z·e z.
(ii) There exists a critical value b z<e z, such that a necessary condition for L to make
pro¯ts, and so to induce coordination, is that z·b z.
If L induces coordination:
(iii) it always makes losses on any critical mass M(KEME);
(iv) the fringe investors ¯nance the z most pro¯table entrepreneurs in the setK¤
znM(KEME),
charging them a uniform interest rate iz;(v) L makes pro¯ts on the entrepreneurs in the set Y , charging them an interest rate
il(q);
(vi) (weakly) more entrepreneurs invest than in the 'maximal' competitive equilibrium.
This increases social welfare relative to the 'maximal' competitive equilibrium, although this
does not constitute a Pareto-improvement.
Proof. (i) If z is larger than e z´Q¡kMmink, L is too small to ¯nance a critical mass, and
thus cannot induce coordination.
(ii) The optimal value of ½(z), denoted by ½¤(z), is a non-increasing function of z. This
can be seen as follows. Suppose we start with a fringe of size z1 and decrease it to z2 <z1.
L can ¯nance those entrepreneurs that were ¯nanced by the `departed' investors z1 ¡z2 at
the same terms. For L this is feasible, but it may not be optimal. For example, it may
manageto chargeitsnew borrowers higher ratesthan thefringeinvestors, orit may prefer to
¯nance some other additional entrepreneurs. And since fringe investors make non-negative
pro¯ts, L cannot decrease its pro¯ts by taking over those loans from them. It follows that







° ¡kMmink we have kY k =0, and so ½¤(z) < 0 from Lemma 1. We





°¡kMmink. ½(z)¸0 is however only a necessary condition, since L may prefer to
induce some other equilibrium that has not all entrepreneurs in KEME setting up a ¯rm.
(iii) Follows directly from Lemma 1.
(iv) ¡(v) Follow directly from Lemma 2.
(vi) If L achieves coordination, then by de¯nition K¤
z ¶KEME. Since all entrepreneurs
and investors are making non-negative pro¯ts and since there are no negative externali-
ties, it immediately follows that L induces a (weakly) higher level of social welfare than
the `maximal' competitive equilibrium EME. However this does not constitute a Pareto-
improvement because entrepreneurs in Y and Z pay a higher interest rate than in the
competitive equilibrium. 2
The ¯nal proposition examines how the necessary conditions for investor coordination
change when the investors use equity.
Proposition 8 If, in addition to debt, investors can provide ¯nance by taking equity posi-
tions:






°, so that the necessary condition for L to
induce coordination can be relaxed to z·b b z;
(ii) the cost of ¯nancing any critical mass M is reduced;
Suppose the investors hold only equity, then,(iii) for a given W, there exists b F such that Ã< 0 if and only if F > b F.
(iv) for a given F, there exists c W such that Ã<0 if and only if W > c W.
Proof. (i) ¡ (ii) Consider any critical mass M and a catalytic loan »(M). We can write
Dm(q)=(1+im(q))X so that ¯[f(Kp(q);q)¡Dm(q)]¸W for all q2M and some pessimistic
belief Kp. The pessimistic belief may depend on entrepreneur q, in the same manner we
described for the chain of expectations in the example of the main text. Then consider
any `catalytic pure equity contract' ®m(q) which gives each entrepreneur in M the same
return under the pessimistic belief: ¯(1¡®m(q))f(Kp(q);q)=¯[f(Kp(q);q)¡Dm(q)]. Once
coordination is achieved we have f(K¤
z;q) ¸ f(Kp(q);q), so that ¯(1¡®m(q))f(K¤
z ;q) ·
¯[f(K¤
z ;q)¡Dm(q)], and thus ¯®mf(K¤
z; q) ¸ ¯Dm(q). Consequently, L makes higher
pro¯ts on all the entrepreneurs in M, as it can now participate in the value created by its
coordination activity.
In equilibrium the fringe investors may undercut L on entrepreneurs in M. If W is
small enough, then ® may be quite large, implying that L is making large pro¯ts on some
of the entrepreneurs in the critical mass. But as we have seen in the previous section, L
prefers not to competewith the fringefor the most pro¯table entrepreneurs, which may now
include some of the entrepreneurs in the critical mass. This, however, does not contradict
the analysis since L simply makes neither pro¯t nor loss on these entrepreneurs. This
completes the proof for part (ii).
Let b b z be the maximum size of the competitive fringe when equity ¯nancing is possible.
It must be that b b z¸b z, otherwise L could o®er the standard debt contract and still induce
coordination at z =b z>b b z. To seethatb b z>b zispossiblenote that from part (ii) L makesfewer
losses on the entrepreneurs in M. It may therefore a®ord to ¯nance fewer entrepreneurs
in Y than before, and still have ½¤(q) ¸ 0. Finally suppose b b z > Q ¡ kMmink. Then
L is too small to ¯nance any critical mass, and the SQE remains an equilibrium. Thus
b b z·Q¡kMmink, Moreover, if Mmin is not pro¯tableon itsown oncecoordination isachieved
then b b z<Q¡kMmink. This completes the proof for part (i).
(iii) Considerany critical mass M(KEME)½KEME, and a resulting equilibrium KEME
z
As before, we have ½q = ¯f(KEME
z ;q) ¡ F ¡ W(
f(KEME
z ;q)
f(q;q) ¡ 1). Summing over all
q 2 M(KEME), we ¯nd Ã = ¥ ¡MF ¡W§, where ¥ =
PM
q=1 ¯f(KEME





f(q;q) ¡1). We have Ã < 0 for F > b F = ¥
M ¡ W §
M and similarly, Ã < 0 for
E > c W = ¥¡MF
§ . 2
Proof of Lemma 1










(Q¡EL)3 < 0. It is useful torewrite the ¯rst-order condition as µ(Q¡ EL)2 ¡(Q¡z)Ez = 0. If EL =0 then this is
satis¯ed at µ = µ. Similarly, if EL =z then this is satis¯ed at µ=µ. Therefore, for µ < µ,
µ(Q ¡EL)2 ¡(Q¡z)Ez <0 for all values of EL, so that EL =0 is optimal. For µ >µ,
µ(Q ¡ EL)2 ¡ (Q¡ z)Ez > 0 for all values of EL, so that EL = z is optimal. And for
µ <µ < µ, we can always ¯nd EL 2 (0; z), so that µ(Q¡EL)2 ¡(Q¡z)Ez =0. 2







dz . The ¯rst e®ect is simply given by dEz
dz > 0 . The
second and third e®ects depend on µ. For µ <µ, we have a corner solution: EL =0, so
that
@EL




dz =0. Both the second and third e®ect are then zero, so that
dE
dz > 0. For µ >µ, we have EL = z, so that @EL
@z =1 and @EL
@Ez
dEz
dz =0. Now the second
e®ect is positive while the third e®ect is zero, so that dE






@Ez =frac(Q¡z)2µ(Q¡EL). The second e®ect is thus positive,
while thethird e®ect is negative. Asa result, dE







From the ¯rst-order condition we can use (Q ¡EL) =
q
(Q¡z)Ez












dz > 0. A su±cient condition for this to hold is that





, 4µEz >Q ¡z. If this
is true at µ =µ, then it is true for all values of µ. It is easy to show that 4µEz >Q ¡z
is equivalent to Ez >
Q
2 . Thus, Ez >
Q
2 is a su±cient condition for dE
dz >0. However, it
is by no means necessary. Indeed, suppose that Ez <
Q
2 , so that there are some values
of µ (in the neighborhood of µ) where the third e®ect dominates the ¯rst. In this case,
all that is required for dE
dz > 0 to hold is that dEz


















. If this is satis¯ed at µ = µ, then it
is satis¯ed for all values of µ. Finally, it is instructive to examine the special case where
fringe banks reinvest their pro¯ts at a constant rate Á, so that Ez = zÁizX. After some




Q¡z . If this
condition is satis¯ed, then dE
dz >0 for all values of µ. But even if it is not satis¯ed, we still
¯nd that dE
dz >0 for most values of µ, except in a neighborhood of µ=µ. 2 
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